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Notes and Comments
THE LAW OF UNSEAWORTHINESS AND
THE DOCTRINE OF INSTANT
UNSEAWORTHINESS
A shipowner has an absolute duty to certain persons working
upon his ship to furnish a seaworthy vessel, that is, a ship and its
appurtenances reasonably fit for their intended use. If the ship is unseaworthy, the shipowner is liable for personal injury caused by such
unseaworthiness to persons to whom the "warranty" extends. It is
the purpose of this Comment to examine generally the development
and present state of the law of unseaworthiness as it pertains to liability for personal injury, with particular emphasis on the doctrine of
instant unseaworthiness. First, the unseaworthiness remedy will be
placed in the context of other personal injury remedies available to
persons covered by the doctrine. Policy reasons advanced for the
development of the law of unseaworthiness will then be observed. With
these considerations in mind, the expansion of the coverage of the
unseaworthiness remedy will be examined. Finally, the act-condition
distinction of the doctrine of instant unseaworthiness and the effect of
puzzling recent Supreme Court cases upon it will be analyzed, hopefully with some measure of predictive reliability.
REMEDIES FOR PERSONAL INJURY

The law concerning the right to recover damages for personal
injury caused by unseaworthiness has developed almost completely
as a matter of general, judge-made, maritime law.' Such recovery
1. The general maritime law provides no right to a jury trial when suit is
brought solely on a claim of unseaworthiness. Considine v. Black Diamond S.S. Corp.,
163 F. Supp. 109 (D. Mass. 1958). A plaintiff suing for damages for injuries caused
by unseaworthiness can, however, procure a jury trial on the issue of unseaworthiness
if he can establish diversity of citizenship and an adequate amount in controversy,
see Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959); 28

U.S.C.

§ 1332 (1964), or if his unseaworthiness claim is joined with a claim of

negligence under the Jones Act, see Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539
(1960). Jury trials can also be obtained under a federal statute in cases in which
injury has occurred on certain types of ships upon United States lakes and navigable

waters between lakes. 28 U.S.C. § 1873 (1964).
The general maritime law, in the absence of statutes of limitation, applies the
doctrine of laches to bar actions marked by an unexcused delay in bringing suit, if
such delay has caused prejudice to an opposing party. M. NoRs, MARITIM4 PXRSONAL
INJURMS § 78, at 195-97 (2d ed. 1966). The various statutes applied to maritime injury and death cases carry their own limitation provisions: Longshoremen's & Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 913(a) (1964) (generally one year to file
claim, though subject to exceptions); Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.
§ 56 (1964) (three years); Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964) (incorporating
F.E.L.A. by reference); Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. § 745 (1964) (two
years) ; Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 763 (1964) (generally two years,
but subject to exceptions) ; Public Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C. § 782 (1964) (two years).
The time for bringing actions for personal injury caused by unseaworthiness has not
been limited by statute, except in suits against the United States, see Suits in
Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. § 745 (1964) (two years) ; Public Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C.
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may be claimed against a vessel in rem 2 or against a shipowner 8 or
bareboat charterer' in personam. Unlike unseaworthiness liability for
damage to cargo, 5 unseaworthiness liability for personal injuries has,
in general, not been restricted by statute.6 The unseaworthiness
remedy is available to seamen and certain harbor workers.' Injured
seamen may also use the remedy provided by the Jones Act,8 which
makes an employer liable, in personam, 9 for the personal injury or
death"° of an employee seaman caused by negligence attributable to
§

782 (1964) (same), and thus an action against some other defendant is barred by
delay only when such delay causes the doctrine of laches to come into play, White v.
United States Lines Co., 254 F. Supp. 480 (D. Md. 1965). Actions for personal injury
caused by unseaworthiness, however, like other maritime actions, may be subject to
certain statutory limitations on the amount of recovery. Generally recovery is limited
to the value of the ship or the owner-defendant's interest in it. Grillea v. United
States, 232 F.2d 919, 923 (2d Cir. 1956); Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C.
§ 181-95 (1964). See also G. GILMORE & C. BLAcK, THE LAW or ADMIRALTY ch. 10
(1957); M. NORRIS, MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES ch. 7 (2d ed. 1966).
2. Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963) (despite bareboat charter) ; The
Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903) (dictum) ; cf. The State of Maryland, 85 F.2d 944
(4th Cir. 1936) (suit in rem for analogous duty to warn of dangerous propensities of
machinery). But see Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. § 741 (1964) (arrest or
seizure by judicial process not allowed of vessel owned by United States) ; Public
Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C. § 788 (1964) (no lien against vessel owned by United States).
3. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903) (dictum); Considine v. Black Diamond
S.S. Corp., 163 F. Supp. 109 (D. Mass. 1958). The United States has allowed
admiralty suits to be brought against itself in personam in regard to its vessels where
such suits could have been brought had the vessels been privately owned, 46 U.S.C.
§ 742 (1964), but in such cases the provisions of the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46
U.S.C. §§ 741-52 (1964), and the Public Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-90 (1964),
control the litigation.
4. Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963). A bareboat or demise charterer is
one who charters or leases a vessel for a period of time during which he directs the
operations of the vessel, controls its movements, employs its master and crew, and
pays its operating expenses. Unseaworthiness liability does not attach to a time
charterer, Considine v. Black Diamond S.S. Corp., 163 F. Supp. 109 (D. Mass. 1958),
or voyage charterer, who does not control the operations of the ship but merely orders
its master to carry certain cargo on certain voyages, does not employ the ship's master
or crew, and does not pay operating expenses. M. NORRIS, MARITIME PERSONAL
INJURIES

§ 85, at 212 (2d ed. 1966).

5. Unseaworthiness liability for cargo damage has been restricted by the Harter
Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-95 (1964), and by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46
U.S.C. § 1300-15 (1964).
6. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944) (discussing Harter Act).
7. See notes 98-118 infra and accompanying text.
8. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
9. There is no liability in rem under the Jones Act. Plamals v. Pinar Del Rio,
277 U.S. 151 (1928), overruled on other grounds, Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321
U.S. 96 (1944).
10. The general maritime law has provided no right of recovery for wrongful
death in the absence of statute. The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959);
Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38 (1930). The Jones Act has provided such a
remedy, but only for the death of a seaman caused by the negligence of his employer.
See Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964), incorporating by reference, Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1964). The Jones Act has been construed as
not providing a remedy for death caused by unseaworthiness, Lindgren v. United
States, 281 U.S. 38 (1930); Doyle v. Albatross Tanker Corp., 260 F. Supp. 303
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) ; Holland v. Steag, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 203 (D. Mass. 1956), and as
precluding state statutory death remedies in favor of those provided by the Act,
Lindgren v. United States, supra; Holland v. Steag, Inc., supra. The Death on the
High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1964), has provided a remedy for the wrongful
death of any person on the high seas. It has been construed to provide a remedy for
death by unseaworthiness, Doyle v. Albatross Tanker Corp., 260 F. Supp. 303
(S.D.N.Y. 1965), but it is applicable only to deaths on the high seas beyond one
marine league (three nautical miles), M. NORRIS, MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIMS
§ 109, at 249 n.12 (2d ed. 1966), from shore, 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1964), and does not
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the employer." The Act incorporates by reference the liberal provisions of the Federal Employer's Liability Act 12 governing liability
of employers for the personal injury and death of railroad workers.
In addition to, and independent of,"8 his possible right to recover
for unseaworthiness or under the Jones Act:
The seaman when sick or injured in the service of the vessel
without willful misbehavior on his part, is entitled to the remedy
of maintenance and cure, i.e., wages to the end of the voyage and
subsistence, lodging and care to the point where the maximum
cure attainable has been reached. . . . The right to maintenance
is not dependent on the fault of the shipowner or absence of
fault on the part of the seaman.' 4
As indicated in the foregoing quotation, the remedy of maintenance and cure provides no recovery for pain and suffering and only
limited recovery of lost "wages."
The harbor worker has no right to maintenance and cure or to
an action for damages under the Jones Act.' 5 The Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act'" has provided for payapply to marine deaths upon the Great Lakes or other inland waterways, M. NORRIS,
supra § 109, at 249. The Act provides recovery only for the pecuniary loss to a limited
class of beneficiaries and does not provide recovery for the conscious suffering of the
deceased prior to death. M. NORRIS, MARITIMS PERSONAL INJURIES § 135, at 352-53 (2d
ed. 1966). The Supreme Court has not decided the issue, but the lower federal courts
agree that a seaman's personal representative can sue for wrongful death under either
the Jones Act or the Death on the High Seas Act. G. GInMoaz & C. BLACK, TnH
LAw oi: ADMIRALTY § 6-30, at 304 (1957). The Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act provides for compensation for death within or without a marine
league from shore and upon any navigable waters of the United States, but it applies
only to longshoremen and other harbor workers. 33 U.S.C. § 903 (1964). It allows
recovery only to a limited class of beneficiaries. 33 U.S.C. § 909 (1964). In cases
of marine death not covered by these statutes, state statutory remedies have been
allowed, see, e.g., The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959); Holley v. The
Manfred Stansfield, 186 F. Supp. 212 (E.D. Va. 1960), but when such state statutory
remedies for wrongful death are applied to maritime cases, defenses that are not available under the general maritime law, see notes 31-35 infra and accompanying text, but
that are incorporated by the state statute, are nevertheless applied to maritime cases
and operate to bar recovery when applicable, The Tungus v. Skovgaard, supra.
In the case of death caused by personal injury suffered in the course of
employment, the Jones Act provides recovery for the suffering of the deceased before
death as well as for pecuniary loss to relatives, but restricts recovery to a specific
class of beneficiaries, M. NORRIS, MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES § 134, at 347-50 (2d
ed. 1966), and its remedy is restricted, as in wrongful death, to injury of a seaman
caused by the negligence of his employer. The Jones Act does not provide for survival
of personal injury actions where death was not caused by the tort causing injury. See
45 U.S.C. §§ 51, 59 (1964); 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964). The Longshoremen's & Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act also provides for the survival of claims for the benefit of
certain persons. 33 U.S.C. § 908(d) (1964). In other cases of marine personal injury,
the survival of causes of action has been allowed under state statutes. E.g., Holland
v. Steag, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 203 (D. Mass. 1956).
11. The Supreme Court has stated that if both unseaworthiness and Jones Act
negligence claims are to be brought, they must both be brought in the same action.
McAllister v. Magnolia Petro. Co., 357 U.S. 221, 224-25 (1958).
12. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1964).
13. Pacific S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130 (1928).
14. M. NORRIS, MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES § 13, at 24 (2d ed. 1966).

15. M.

NORRIS, MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES

Act applies only to seamen.
16. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1964).

§ 13, at 23 (2d ed. 1966). The
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ment of compensation to longshoremen and other harbor workers for
death or disability resulting from injury occurring on navigable waters
of the United States (including drydocks). However, compensation
under this Act is denied to a harbor worker whose injury is caused
by his own intoxication or willful intention to injure or kill himself
or another." The Act also provides that its compensation remedy
is exclusive and precludes actions against employers, unless an employer fails to secure the compensation remedy.'" The Act provides,
however, that an injured harbor worker may maintain a tort action
against any third-party tort-feasor who is responsible for his injury. 9
In such third-party tort actions harbor workers have been allowed to
recover from shipowners for injury caused by negligence,20 by negli22
gent failure to provide a safe place to work, 21 and by unseaworthiness.
The courts have found an "implied warranty of workmanlike
service" in contracts made for the benefit of ships.23 Such an implied
warranty gives the shipowner a right of indemnity against the party
primarily responsible for an injury which has given rise to the liability of the shipowner. Despite the exclusive remedy provision of the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,24 injured
harbor workers have been allowed to recover from shipowners, and
shipowners have been allowed to recover over against bareboat charterers 25 and independent contractors, 26 even where these ultimately
liable parties were the employers of the injured harbor workers.
Indeed, in apparent contravention of the statute, the Supreme Court
has allowed a harbor worker to recover directly from his own employer for injury caused by unseaworthiness where the employer was
also the shipowner.2 ' Thus, an injured harbor worker has a com17. 33 U.S.C. § 903 (1964).
18. 33 U.S.C. § 904 (1964).
19. 33 U.S.C. § 933 (1964).
20. In Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 413-14 (1953), the Supreme
Court stated that The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903), which denied recovery from a
shipowner for injury caused aboard ship by the master or other crew member, only
applied to injured seamen and did not bar recovery for injury caused by negligence to
anyone not a seaman. In Hawn the injured plaintiff was a repairman employed by an
independent contractor; he was allowed to recover for injuries caused by a bareboat
charterer's negligence and by unseaworthiness. In such a case a bareboat charterer is
treated the same as a shipowner.
21. See M. NORRIS, MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES § 40, at 83-87 (2d ed. 1966).
22. See notes 98-115 infra and accompanying text.
23. See Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376
U.S. 315 (1964) (indemnity though equipment supplied by stevedore latently defective); Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Dugan & McNamara, Inc., 364 U.S. 421 (1960)
(indemnity even though stevedore negligence only calls ship's unseaworthiness into
play and even though there was no privity of contract between shipowner and stevedore, on theory that ship is implied third-party beneficiary of stevedoring contact)
Crumady v. The J.H. Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959) (indemnity despite lack of privity);
Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563 (1958) (indemnity
despite fault of shipowner) ; Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350
U.S. 124 (1956) (negligence of contractor's employee).
24. 33 U.S.C. § 904 (1964).
25. Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963) (in rem).
26. E.g., Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co.,
376 U.S. 315 (1964) ; Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S.
124 (1956).
27. Jackson v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 386 U.S. 731 (1967).
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pensation remedy against his employer and a negligence or unseaworthiness remedy against any third-party tort-feasor,2 8 or his own
employer if the employer is also the shipowner.
Other persons, such as passengers 29 or visitors,"0 who are not
crew members or harbor workers but who are rightfully aboard ship
are denied recovery for unseaworthiness but may recover for negligent
failure to provide reasonably safe premises.
Various defenses available at common law are unavailable in
admiralty. Though a seaman is said to assume the risks of his calling,3 '
he does not assume the risk of unseaworthy conditions. Thus, assumption of risk is not a defense to liability for unseaworthiness.3 2 Nor
is the common law fellow-servant doctrine a defense to unseaworthiness liability.33 The common law defense of contributory negligence
has been adopted by the maritime law only in the form of "comparative negligence"; thus contributory negligence does not serve as a bar
to recovery in admiralty, but operates only in mitigation of damages, 4
although mitigation may apparently be total in a proper case.
These
common law defenses are denied application, and the comparative
negligence device has been adopted in suits under the Jones Act,'3
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 7 and
the Death on the High Seas Act. 8
POLICY REASONS FOR THE SPECIAL TREATMENT
OF SEAMEN AND HARBOR WORKERS

Courts have followed a policy of giving seamen treatment more
favorable than that given other workers or people in general. This
special treatment has been evidenced by a policy of construing statutes
28. This includes a suit in rem against a vessel for unseaworthiness. See Reed
v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963).
29. See M. NoRRIs, MARITIME PXRSONAL INJURIES §§ 86-107, 110 (2d ed. 1966).
30. See Id. § 108, at 247-49. See also notes 109-10 infra and accompanying text.
31. The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110 (1936); Rush v. Cargo Ships &
Tankers, Inc., 360 F.2d 766 (2d Cir. 1966).
32. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 94 n.11 (1946); Mahnich v.
Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944); Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S.
424 (1939) ; The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110 (1936).
33. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946); Mahnich v. Southern
S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944) ; Skibinski v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 360 F.2d 539 (2d
Cir. 1966) ; cf. The State of Maryland, 85 F.2d 944 (4th Cir. 1936) (no defense to
analogous duty to warn of dangerous propensities of machines).
34. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953); Seas Shipping Co. v.
Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946); Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 429
(1939) ; Grillea v. United States, 232 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1956).
35. Donovan v. Esso Shipping Co., 259 F.2d 65 (3d Cir. 1958) (allegedly unseaworthy condition caused solely by the negligence of the injured party). See text
accompanying notes 151-55 infra.
36. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424 (1939) (contributory negligence serves only to mitigate damages) ; The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110 (1936)
(assumption of risk no defense) ; 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1964) ; 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
37. The defenses of assumption of risk, the fellow-servant doctrine, and contributory negligence do not apply at all to the compensation remedy. In suits brought
under the Act against employers failing to secure compensation, the defenses do not
operate to bar recovery, and contributory negligence operates only in mitigation of
damages. 33 U.S.C. § 904-05 (1964).
38. 46 U.S.C. § 766-68 (1964).
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liberally in their favor, 9 by the restriction of defenses to their suits,40
and by the expansion of the scope of liability for unseaworthiness. 41
The courts have justified this special treatment on three major grounds:
the characterization of seamen as men unable to take care of themselves
very satisfactorily; the especially hazardous nature of their profession;
and the desire to spread loss throughout the shipping industry through
the medium of insurance.
The seaman has traditionally been known as the "ward of the
admiralty." 42 He has been looked upon sympathetically as ignorant,
helpless, and in need of protection even from himself. 4' This characterization has been used to justify special treatment. The nature of
the calling has also been used as a justification for liberal treatment
of seamen. The rigid discipline of shipboard life, 4 the inability to
leave ship at sea or even in port without incurring sanctions, 4' and the
particularly hazardous nature of the profession, 6 especially since the
advent of steam, 47 have been offered as peculiar characteristics of the
trade requiring special treatment. It has been widely felt that it is
unfair to put the loss of such a hazardous trade upon seamen, those
least able to bear it financially. It is argued that it is better to distribute the loss among the users of the shipping industry through the
medium of insurance, the cost of which is ultimately reflected in the
price of shipping services. It is the shipowner and those in a similar
position that have been chosen as those best situated to purchase the
insurance.48 It is also argued that the placing of the loss upon the
shipowner, at least originally, is a good means for promoting greater
care in the industry49 and that through the right of indemnity for
breach of the implied warranty of workmanlike service the ultimate
39. See Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424 (1939); The Arizona v.
Anelich, 298 U.S. 110 (1936) ; Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155 (1934).
40. See Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424 (1939) ; The Arizona v.
Anelich, 298 U.S. 110 (1936); notes 31-35 supra and accompanying text.
41. See Hudson Waterways Corp. v. Schneider, 365 F.2d 1012 (9th Cir. 1966);
Krey v. United States, 123 F.2d 1008 (2d Cir. 1941); The H.A. Scandrett, 87 F.2d
708 (2d Cir. 1937) ; notes 64-118 infra and accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 103 (1944).
43. Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155 (1934) (construing Jones Act liberally).
44. See United Pilots Ass'n v. Halecki, 358 U.S. 613 (1959); Mahnich v.
Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944); Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith 305 U.S.
424 (1939); Hudson Waterways Corp. v. Schneider, 365 F.2d 1012 (9th dr. 1966).
45. See United Pilots Ass'n v. Halecki, 358 U.S. 613 (1959); Mahnich v.
Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944); Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S.
424 (1939).
46. See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946); Krey v. United
States, 123 F.2d 1008 (2d Cir. 1941) ; The H.A. Scandrett, 87 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1937).
47. See The State of Maryland, 85 F.2d 944 (4th Cir. 1936) (created absolute
duty to warn of dangerous propensities of machinery, analogous to duty to furnish a
seaworthy vessel, because of increased hazard to seamen caused by shipping industry's
change from sail to steam). See also M. NoRRis, MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES § 31,
at 62-63 (2d ed. 1966).
48. See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946) ; Ezekiel v. Volusia
Steamship Co., 297 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1961) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 843, reh. denied, 369 U.S. 891 (1962); Keen v. Overseas Tankship Corp., 194
F.2d 515 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 966 (1952) ; The H.A. Scandrett, 87 F.2d
708 (2d Cir. 1937).
49. See Ezekiel v. Volusia Steamship Co., 297 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1961) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 843, reh. denied, 369 U.S. 891 (1962).

1968]

UNSEAWORTHINESS

loss (in the absence of insurance) is placed upon the party best able
to minimize the risk involved."
As indicated above, the courts have generally followed the lead
of the Supreme Court in its policy of liberal treatment for seamen.
Some of the arguments offered in support of special treatment for
seamen have also been used to justify similar treatment for longshoremen and other harbor workers under the unseaworthiness doctrine,
on the grounds that they are employed to do work formerly done by
seamen. 1 Legal commentaries, however, have been very much in
conflict over the issue of special treatment for seamen. In addition to
the arguments raised by judges favoring special treatment, commentaries have offered additional arguments supporting this view. 2 Thus
it has been argued that special protection for seamen has a salutary
effect on the shipping industry in that broad protection will attract
men into the hazardous trade.
It is also argued that despite improvements in living and working conditions aboard ship, these improvements have not out-stripped similar improvements in shorebased industries, and that, basically,
the inconveniences and dangers of
54
going to sea have changed little.
Several arguments have been offered in opposition to the policy
of special treatment for seamen and particularly in opposition to further liberalization of
the law towards seamen and harbor workers
"similarly" situated.5 It is argued that a seaman's living and working conditions have improved to a point where there is no longer
justification for better treatment than shore-based workers, if indeed
there ever was.58 It is also argued that the enterprise liability theory
is not necessarily effective in spreading the loss of a hazardous industry
among its users, since many insurers have withdrawn from coverage
and rates are high. The cost of insurance or of judgments to the uninsured cannot necessarily be reflected in the price of services offered,
especially since the American shipping industry must compete with
those of other countries and with other means of transportation.57
It is also noted that the shipping industry is in a depressed condition,,
that it is important to the welfare of the nation, and that seamen
50. See Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376
U.S. 315 (1964).
51. See notes 98-108 infra and accompanying text.
52. See generally Norris, The Seaman as Ward of the Admiralty, 52 MICH. L.
Rzv. 479 (1954); Standard, Are the Admiralty's "Jolly Little Wards" Really So
Privileged?, 46 A.B.A.J. 1323 (1960); 66 COLUm. L. REv. 1180 (1966).
53. Norris, The Seaman as Ward of the Admiralty, 52 MICH. L. R~v. 479 (1954).
54. Id.
55. See generally Foley, A Survey of the Maritime Doctrine of Seaworthiness,
46 ORE. L. Rxv. 369 (1967); Lovitt, Things Are Seldom What They Seem: The
Jolly Little Wards of the Admiralty, 46 A.B.A.J. 171 (1960); Tetrault, Seamen,
Seaworthiness, and the Rights of Harbor Workers, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 381 (1954);
Wood, "Old Father Antic the Law": The Favorites of the Courts of Admiralty,
41 A.B.A.J. 924 (1955) ; 15 S.W.L.J. 328 (1961).
56. Foley, A Survey of the Maritime Doctrine of Seaworthiness, 46 0.
L. REv.
369 (1967); Norris, The Seaman as Ward of the Admiralty, 52 MICH. L. REv.

479 (1954).
57. See Foley, A Survey of
Rzv. 369, 421 (1967); Tetrault,
Workers, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 381,
58. 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1180

the Maritime Doctrine of Seaworthiness, 46 O E. L.
Seamen, Seaworthiness, and the Rights of Harbor
416-18 (1954).
(1966).
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benefit from the industry as well as do its users. 9 It has been argued
that the absolute liability imposed by the unseaworthiness doctrine is
unjustified because seamen have the absolute right to maintenance
and cure, and harbor workers the absolute right to compensation.60
It has also been argued that the expansion of the doctrine of unseaworthiness in general is unjustified because the doctrine permits suits
in rem, the law in general being opposed to the expansion of secret
liens, 6 ' and because it is engulfing the Jones Act,62 although it has
been argued to the contrary that the substitution of one remedy for
two is always beneficial.63
Since the Supreme Court has consistently decided that seamen
and harbor workers are to be liberally treated, it would seem that
criticism would now be more constructively directed to improvement
of the vehicle which is to achieve this result, consistent with fairness
to prospective defendants. In this vein, it would seem that the law of
unseaworthiness, specifically, could use streamlining. Before any conclusion can be drawn, however, it is first necessary to trace the development of the law of unseaworthiness by following the expansion of
the factual scope of coverage and the class of persons covered.
THE EXPANSION

OF THE SCOPE OF COVERAGE

OF THE UNSEAWORTHINESS

DOCTRINE

The right of a seaman to indemnity for personal injuries caused
by unseaworthiness was first noted by the Supreme Court in a dictum
by Mr. Justice Brown in The Osceola64 in 1903: "The vessel and her
owner are, both by English and American law, liable to an indemnity
for injuries received by seamen in consequence of the unseaworthiness
of the ship, or a failure to supply and keep in order the proper appliances appurtenant to the ship." 65 Since The Osceola, the factual scope
of coverage of the doctrine of unseaworthiness has been tremendously
expanded,66 particularly in recent years, despite a fairly consistent
59. Foley, A Survey of the Maritime Doctrine of Seaworthiness, 46 ORE. L.
Rev. 369, 420 (1967).
60. Id.
61. 57 YALE L.J. 243, 256 (1947). See also The State of Maryland, 85 F.2d 944
(4th Cir. 1936) (dissenting opinion opposed to creation of new secret lien for duty,
analogous to seaworthiness, to warn of dangerous propensities of machinery).
62. 66 COLUM. L. Rev. 1180 (1966).
63. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW or ADMIRALTY § 6-38, at 316 (1957).
64. 189 U.S. 158 (1903). For discussions of the ancestry of the doctrine prior to
the famous dictum in The Osceola, see Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539
(1960) ; United Pilots Ass'n v. Halecki, 358 U.S. 613 (1959) (dubious ancestry);
Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946) (origins "perhaps unascertainable") ; The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110, 121 n.2 (1936); Tetrault, Seamen,
Seaworthiness, and the Rights of Harbor Workers, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 381 (1954)
G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 6-38, at 316 (1957).
65. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903). The case came to the Supreme Court
on certification of questions, none of which involved seaworthiness, from the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and the holding of the case was that a shipowner is
not liable for the negligent acts of the ship's master or crew. For discussions of the
ancestry of the doctrine prior to The Osceola, see authorities cited in note 64 supra.
66. For discussions of this development see generally Waldron v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 386 U.S. 724 (1967) ; Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539
(1960) ; The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110 (1936) ; Waldron v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 356 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1966) ; G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW
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adherence to the original definition 7 of the term. This expansion has
been led by the Supreme Court itself.6 8 Perhaps because the case
involved an attempt to recover for negligently caused injury, the
Supreme Court's decision in The Osceola was originally interpreted
as giving a remedy only for negligently caused unseaworthiness 6 9
However, in the 1922 case of Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger,7 °

(2d ed. 1966);
Tetrault, Seamen, Seaworthiness, and the Rights of Harbor Workers, 39 CORNXLL
L.Q. 381 (1954).
67. The words used to define seaworthiness have not undergone much change in
decisions by the Supreme Court. In The Silvia, 171 U.S. 462 (1898), a suit for
op ADMIRALTY (1957); M. NoRRis, MARITIME PERSONAL INJURes

damage to cargo, the test was stated to be whether the vessel was reasonably fit to
carry the cargo undertaken to transport. In Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S.
96 (1944), the test applied to a piece of equipment was its adequacy for the purpose
for which it was ordinarily used. Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336
(1955), defined seaworthiness as applied to personnel as whether or not the seaman
in question was equal in disposition and seamanship to the ordinary men of the calling.
In McAllister v. Magnolia Petro. Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958), the Court stated that
the test was not whether a defect was of such quality as to render the whole vessel
unfit for the purpose for which it was intended but that only the fitness of the
particular part of the ship called into question need be observed. The dissent in
Crumady v. The J.H. Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959), defined unseaworthiness as applied
to equipment as reasonable fitness for its intended use. The same definition was
repeated in Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960), in regard to
the duty to furnish tools reasonably fit for their intended use. In Mitchell v. Trawler
Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960), the duty was said to be ". . . to furnish a
vessel and appurtenances reasonably suitable for her intended service." The definition
of reasonable fitness of a vessel for her intended service was repeated in Morales v.
City of Galveston, 370 U.S. 165 (1962). In Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373
U.S. 206 (1963), the term was defined as reasonable fitness for the purpose intended.
The circuit courts have sometimes used slightly different wording to define
seaworthiness. The First Circuit has defined a seaworthy vessel as one sufficient or
reasonably adequate for the trade or service in which it is employed, Doucette v.
Vincent, 194 F.2d 834 (1st Cir. 1952), and seaworthy equipment as "reasonably fit
and safe for its purpose, and reasonably adequate to the place and occasion where
used by direction of the owners," Nunes v. Farrell Lines, 227 F.2d 619, 622 (1st

Cir. 1955).
In addition to the usual wording, the Second Circuit has further defined a
seaworthy vessel as one "as fit for service as similar vessels in similar service,"
Poignant v. United States, 225 F.2d 595 (2d Cir. 1955), and as one reasonably fit for
the purpose for which it is being used, Lester v. United States, 234 F.2d 625 (2d
Cir. 1956). It has also said that a vessel must be in all respects reasonably fit to
permit libelant to perform his task aboard with reasonable safety, id. at 628, and
that it must be reasonably fit for the particular voyage and reasonably fit and safe
for the particular uses or purposes to which it is put. Blier v. United States Lines
Co., 286 F.2d 920 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 836 (1961).
The Fifth Circuit has further defined seaworthiness as the absolute duty to
select and keep in order reasonably suitable appliances. Cox v. Esso Shipping Co.,
247 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1957). In Walker v. Harris, 335 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1964),
the court also phrased seaworthiness as "fit in the eyes of the law for the life and
limb of those who go down to the sea in ships," id. at 190, and as "reasonable fitness
to perform the work at hand," id. at 191. Slightly different wording was also used
in Marshall v. Ove Skou Rederi A/S, 378 F.2d 193, 196 (5th Cir. 1967), quoting
Vickers v. Tumey, 290 F.2d 426, 433 n.5 (5th Cir. 1961): "Seaworthiness ... means
that under the circumstances existing at the time of injury, the vessel and her equipment . . . were reasonably fit to perform the duty of safety, which this vessel owed
to human beings aboard her, and to perform duties for which they were intended."
Other circuits have applied one or another of the definitions noted above.
68. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THn LAW ov ADMIRALTY § 6-5, at 253 n.12 (1957):
"Since the Supreme Court has claimed the field of maritime personal injury litigation
as its own, lower court decisions have suffered from rapid technological obsolescence."
69. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
70. 259 U.S. 255 (1922). Prior to this decision Congress had "reversed" the
holding of The Osceola by passing the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964) ; this act
allows a seaman to recover indemnity for injuries caused by the negligence of a
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the Supreme Court stated, in dictum, that the jury need not have
considered negligence (though there was obvious negligence in the
case) in deciding that the vessel was unseaworthy when it left port
without life preservers and carrying a can containing gasoline which
was marked and used as coal oil.
The next step in this expansion by the Supreme Court did not
occur until 1944 when Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co.7 was decided.
In this case there had been a finding of negligence on the part of a
mate in selecting a rotten rope and ordering it used to support a staging, but the statute of limitations for negligent liability under the
Jones Act had run. Nevertheless, the Court held that the negligence
had created an unseaworthy condition and that, as a result, the shipowner was liable. The seaworthiness of the ship when it left port
and the availability of good rope aboard were held immaterial. The
Court stated that a man must be provided with seaworthy and safe
appliances "when and where . . . work is to be done. '72 Again by
way of dictum, the Court stated that the ship would have been unseaworthy even if the mate had not been negligent because:
The staging from which petitioner fell was an appliance appurtenant to the ship. It was unseaworthy in the sense that it was
inadequate for the purpose for which it was ordinarily used,
because of the defective rope with which it was rigged. Its inadequacy rendered it unseaworthy, whether the mate's failure to
observe the defect was negligent or unavoidable.7"
In 1946, the rule that a finding of negligence is unnecessary to a
finding of unseaworthiness was ostensibly applied in Seas Shipping
Co. v. Sieracki.74 There the Supreme Court affirmed a finding of unseaworthiness based on a latent defect in the forging of a steel shackle. 7
The factual scope of liability was again broadened in 1954 in
Alaska Steamship Co. v. Petterson,76 a per curiam opinion by the
Supreme Court which affirmed a finding of unseaworthiness by merely
citing Sieracki and Pope & Talbot v. Hawn"' without explanation.
In Petterson the alleged unseaworthy condition was a defective snatch
fellow crewman. See Pacific S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130 (1928) (discussing
effect of Jones Act on existing law) ; notes 8-12 supra and accompanying text.
71. 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
72. Id. at 104.
73. Id. at 103.
74. 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
75. The finding was not disputed by the defendant who chose to contend that the
libelant should not be covered because he was a longshoreman. See the discussion
of the expansion of the class of people covered by the unseaworthiness doctrine,
originating in this case, in notes 98-102 infra and accompanying text.
76. 347 U.S. 396 (1954).
77. 346 U.S. 406 (1953). As aptly pointed out by the Petterson dissent, neither
the Sieracki nor the Hawn decisions, cited as authority, had touched the real issue of
the Petterson case. Sieracki and Hawn had merely extended the coverage of the unseaworthiness warranty to longshoremen and repairmen, respectively, while Sieracki
also upheld recovery for injury caused by a latent defect in equipment. The real issue
in Petterson was not whether unseaworthiness liability should attach for injury to
a man clearly a Sieracki "seaman" (longshoreman), but whether unseaworthiness
liability should attach where injury was caused by a defect in equipment belonging to,
brought aboard by, and used by the stevedoring company, an issue not present in
either of the other cases.
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block. Such an item is standard equipment aboard a ship, but this
one was brought aboard by a stevedoring company and was used
solely by its employees. Since Petterson, liability for defective equipment brought aboard and controlled by others has been extended by
the lower federal courts to equipment not customarily found aboard
ship.78 The lower federal courts have also interpreted 79 Petterson and
its companion per curiam opinion Rogers v. United States Lines 0
as overruling a line of lower court cases which had held that a shipowner was not liable for the unseaworthiness of a part of a vessel
over which control had been relinquished to a contractor for repairs,
unloading, or the like. a '
The next expansion by the Supreme Court of the scope of coverage came in 1955 in Boudoin v. Lykes Brothers Steamship Co."2 In
this case the Court affirmed a finding of liability for unseaworthiness
for an injury caused by an assault by a fellow crew member. The
Court refused to distinguish between defective equipment and defective personnel but stated that liability would not attach for every
ship board assault but only for those in which the assailant was not
equal in disposition and seamanship to the ordinary men in the calling.8"
4 the Court
In 1959, in Crumady v. The Joachin Hendrik Fisser,"
broadened the scope of the warranty, as it pertains to equipment, to
include not only defective equipment, but also equipment which has
been rendered unsafe by the act of a person; unseaworthiness was
found in an incorrect setting on the electrical circuit-breaker of a
winch. This case, however, has not been interpreted to hold that any
improper use of non-defective equipment may give rise to unseaworthiness liability.
The scope of liability was again extended and clarified in 1960.
In Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 85 the Court held that a transitory
unsafe condition (here slime left on the rail of a fishing boat), arising
after leaving port and not caused by negligence, could give rise to
liability for unseaworthiness regardless of whether it had existed long
enough before the injury to give the ship's crew a reasonable opportunity to discover and correct it. The Court stated that there had
been a "complete divorcement of unseaworthiness liability from con78. Arena v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 279 F.2d 186, 188 n.3 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 895 (1960) (dictum - board used to load cargo could have rendered vessel
unseaworthy if defective though not customarily ship's equipment); Considine v.
Black Diamond S.S. Corp., 163 F. Supp. 109 (D. Mass. 1958) (truck).
79. See Norfleet v. Isthmian Lines, Inc., 355 F.2d 359 (2d Cir. 1966) ; Scott v.
Isbrandtsen Co., 327 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1964); Ballwanz v. Isthmian Lines, Inc.,
319 F.2d 457 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 970 (1964); Massa v. C.A.
Venezuelan Navigacion, 298 F.2d 239 (2d Cir. 1962) ; Berti v. Compagnie de Navigation Cyprien Fabre, 213 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1954) (dictum).
80. 347 U.S. 984 (1954).
81. See, e.g., Rogers v. United States Lines, 205 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1953), ree'd,
347 U.S. 984 (1954) (stevedores) ; Byars v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 155 F.2d 587
(2d Cir. 1946) (repairmen).
82. 348 U.S. 336 (1955).
83. The Court here followed the rule set forth by Judge L. Hand in Jones v.
Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 204 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1953), and Keen v. Overseas Tankship
Corp., 194 F.2d 515 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 966 (1952).
84. 358 U.S. 423 (1959).
85. 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
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cepts of negligence."" 6 The Court did not say, however, that the duration of an unsafe condition or the foreseeability of injury could not
in some way influence unseaworthiness liability.
In 1962 in Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines,
Ltd., 7 the Supreme Court extended the warranty to include defective cargo containers - specifically, bands placed around bales. In
the same year the Court also decided Morales v. City of Galveston,"
a case which both limited and extended liability for unseaworthiness.
In Morales the last "shot" of grain loaded into a hold was contaminated with noxious fumes which caused injury. Though the ship was
not equipped with blowers for ventilation, the majority affirmed a
finding of seaworthiness, stating that "what caused injury in the
present case was not the ship, its appurtenances, or its crew, but the
isolated and completely unforeseeable introduction of a noxious agent
from without. ' .. The decision went on by way of dictum, however,
to expand the scope of liability to the method of loading cargo and
the manner of its stowage.90
In 1963, the Supreme Court took still another step in the expansion of the doctrine of unseaworthiness. In Gutierrez v. Waterman Steamship Corp. 1 the Court held that a shipowner could be liable
for unseaworthiness when a longshoreman on the dock onto which
the ship was unloading beans was injured when he slipped on beans
spilled from a leaky bag unloaded from the ship. The Court stated
that the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act a2 had extended
admiralty jurisdiction to maritime torts causing injury ashore and
that under that jurisdiction the seaworthiness warranty would be
extended to defective cargo containers and improper stowage causing
injury ashore. The Court explained that "[s]eaworthiness is not
limited, of course, to fitness for travel on the high seas; it includes
fitness for loading and unloading." ' 3 Though there is substantial disagreement, some lower federal courts have expanded the scope of
liability beyond the Gutierrez holding to include injury ashore from
shore-based equipment not attached to or touching the vessel but in
some way used to perform the ship's work. 4 The dissent in Gutierrez
86. Id. at 550.
87. 369 U.S. 355 (1962).
88. 370 U.S. 165 (1962).
89. Id. at 171 (emphasis added).

90. Id. at 170. The Court here was presumably speaking only of the method or
manner of loading and stowage in the sense of the condition in which cargo is left
aboard by those who have loaded it, and not of the active procedures that are used
in the process of loading and stowing. See the discussion of the act-condition
distinction in notes 165-71 infra and accompanying text.
91. 373 U.S. 206 (1963).
92. 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1964).
93. 373 U.S. at 213.
94. Dugas v. Nippon Yusen Kaisha, 378 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1967) (dictum)
Deffes v. Federal Barge Lines, Inc., 361 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1966) ; Spann v. Lauritzen,
344 F.2d 204 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 938 (1965), reh. denied, 382 U.S. 1000
(1966); Huff v. Matson Navigation Co., 338 F.2d 205 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 943 (1964) ; see Note, Unseaworthy Shore-Based Equipment, 18 HASTINGS
1021 (1967) (supporting extension). Contra, Forkin v. Furness Withy & Co.,
F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1963) ; McKnight v. N.M. Paterson & Sons, 286 F.2d 250 (6th
1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 913 (1961); Fredericks v. American Export Lines,

L.J.
323
Cir.
227
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objected to what it felt to be an extension of liability for unseaworthi-

ness, beyond the manner of stowage of cargo, to the condition of the
cargo itself.9 Though the holding of the Gutierrez case is not clear
on this point, at least one lower federal court has stated that a dangerous condition of cargo itself can render a ship unseaworthy. 6 The
Morales decision has been interpreted as forbidding such an extension,97 but, as will be discussed later, that decision should probably
be interpreted as forbidding an extension of liability to dangerous
cargo only when the dangerous nature of the cargo is unforeseeable
and when the cargo is in the process of being loaded aboard.
ExPANSION OF COVERAGE: CLASS OF PERSONS

Until 1946, the warranty of seaworthiness was available only to
seamen. In that year, however, in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,9 s
the Supreme Court affirmed an award of recovery to a longshoreman, 99 holding that the duty to provide a seaworthy ship extends to all
who do loading and unloading and other ship's work which was traditionally done by seamen.' 00 The Sieracki Court reasoned that a shipF.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 989 (1956); Henry v. S.S. Mount
Evans, 227 F. Supp. 408 (D. Md. 1964).
95. 373 U.S. at 217.
96. Blassingill v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 336 F.2d 367, 371 (9th Cir. 1964).
Contra, Carabellese v. Naviera Aznor, S.A., 285 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1960) (not liable
for defect in cargo alone, without other factors, at least while still being loaded -

decided before Morales and Gutierrez); McMahan v. The Panamolga, 127 F. Supp.
659 (D. Md. 1955) (same).
97. See 37 TUL. L. Riv. 106 (1962) (noting Morales). But see text at and following note 173 infra.
98. 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
99. For general discussions of the extension of the warranty to harbor workers
see M. NoRRis, MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES §§ 14-15, at 25-31 (2d ed. 1966);
Shields & Byrne, Application of the "Unseaworthiness" Doctrine to Longshoremen,
111 U. PA. L. REv. 1137 (1963) ; Tetrault, Seamen, Seaworthiness, and the Rights of
Harbor Workers, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 381 (1954); 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 519 (1962).
In Calderola v. Cunard S.S. Co., 279 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1960), the court stated that
the unseaworthiness warranty to longshoremen would extend only to the limits of the
place of work or to where it is reasonable to expect a longshoreman to go aboard
ship. In Schell v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 264 F. Supp. 484 (E.D. Va. 1967), rev'd on
other grounds, 395 F2d 676 (4th Cir. 1968), the court made mention of the fact that
the plaintiff machinist's helper of the marine mechanical department of defendant railway was within the working area of his assigned task when injured, though liability
was denied on other grounds.
100. This statement about the history of longshoring was repeated again in
Crumady v. The J.H. Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959), but its accuracy has been questioned. Those commentators questioning the historical accuracy of the statement claim
that it would be more accurate to state "that on some vessels in some trades some
mariners sometimes have done some of the loading and unloading of the vessels."
M. NoRRis, MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES § 14, at 26 (2d ed. 1966), quoting Tetrault,
Seamen, Seaworthiness, and the Rights of Harbor Workers, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 381,
414 (1954). See also Shields & Byrne, Application of the "Unseaworthiness" Doctrine
to Longshoremen, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 1137, 1139-47 (1963). One commentator has
argued that regardless of history, harbor workers have as great or greater need of
seaworthy equipment as do seamen, since they must perform very dangerous work
on unfamiliar ships, and that the best way to enforce regulations concerning equipment is to create liability for injury caused by substandard equipment. R. Klonsky,
New Longshoremen -

His Status In

Jeopardy, TENTH

ANNUAL

PROCEEDINGS,

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CLAIMANTS COMPENSATION ArrORNEYS (1956), quoted in
M. NORIS, MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES § 14, at 26-27 (2d ed. 1966). If longshoremen were denied unseaworthiness coverage there would be little incentive for
shipowners to keep equipment that is predominantly used by longshoremen rather
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owner should not be allowed to escape liability by contracting away
dangerous work to an independent contractor. The liability for unseaworthiness, based not on contract or negligence but on the relationship
of the worker to the hazards of marine service, was to be extended to
anyone "doing a seaman's work and incurring a seaman's hazards."'1 '
A strong dissent in Sieracki questioned the validity of extending coverage to persons who do not really incur a seaman's hazards, who do
not go to sea, who are not subject to 02the same rigid discipline and who
can leave a vessel when they desire.1
The class of persons covered by what has become known as the
"warranty" of seaworthiness, despite its non-contractual basis, was
extended in 1953, in Pope & Talbot v. Hawn,0 3 to a repairman10 4
who had been called aboard ship to repair grain-loading equipment
and was injured there in a slip and fall. Again a strong dissent questioned the extension of the warranty to one "who lived at home, was
free to leave his employment, took no risks of the sea and had no
different condition or hazard attached to his employment than would
have attached to a carpentry job in a building ashore."' '
In 1959, the Supreme Court seemingly placed a limitation on
the class of people to be protected by the warranty. In United Pilots
Ass'n v. Halecki,10 6 the estate of a repairman was denied recovery for
death caused by inhaling carbon tetrachloride fumes while spraying
the inside of a dismantled generator during an annual overhaul.
Recovery was denied on the ground that the injured repairman was
a specialized worker using specialized equipment in performing work
not traditionally done by seamen. The effect to be given this decision,
however, is unclear. Sieracki held that a modern division of labor
was not to relieve a shipowner of liability for work traditionally done
by seamen, and Hawn included repairing as work traditionally done
by seamen. It is difficult to see any meaningful distinction between
the repair work done in Hawn and the repair work done in Halecki,
except that the former was performed in the course of loading while
the latter was a bit more specialized, involving more specialized equipment. It is also difficult to see a meaningful distinction between the
than seamen up to standard. It has also been argued that the longshoreman has a
peculiar need for the absolute liability and in rem provisions of unseaworthiness
coverage, since he is likely to be injured on transient ships of a foreign register,
against which it would be very difficult and expensive to prove a case of common law
negligence. Letter from Bernard Chozen to House Committee on Education and
Labor, Report by Special Subcommittee, December 1956, quoted in M. NORRIS,
MARITIMe PERSONAL INJURIS

§ 14, at 27-29 (2d ed. 1966).

Though the Sieracki case is binding precedent upon lower courts, doubt as
to the historical accuracy of its rationale has led at least Judge Friendly of the Second
Circuit to seek to restrict its application. See Forkin v. Furness Withy & Co., 323
F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1963); Shenker v. United States, 322 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1963)
(dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 907 (1964).
101. 328 U.S. at 99.
102. For a discussion of the justification for awarding seamen special treatment
under the seaworthiness doctrine see notes 39-63 supra and accompanying text.
103. 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
104. Cf. The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959) (recovery by stevedore
maintenance foreman).
105. 346 U.S. at 424.
106. 358 U.S. 613 (1959).
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cleaning in Halecki and the cleaning traditionally and presently done
by seamen.
The Halecki decision has not, in fact, provided the lower federal

courts with a workable guide to the limits of the class of persons
covered by the unseaworthiness warranty. 10 7 This is not surprising in
view of the varied nature of work done by seamen down through the
centuries under sail and steam:

If the test is to be whether the injured person was performing
the customary work of the crew at the time of injury, it should
be evident that aside from ship repairs of a major type such as
collision damage repairs and reconversions, virtually all maintenance and repair work now performed by shoreside specialists
under contract should come under the seaworthiness doctrine for
they are duties once carried out by the ship's crew.'0°
Other limitations were placed upon the coverage of the unseaworthiness doctrine in 1959. In Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale
0 9 the protection of the
Transatlantique,
warranty was denied to a
crew-member's social guest who was rightfully aboard the ship, 110
and, in West v. United States,"' the protection of the warranty was
denied to a repairman injured while repairing a ship undergoing a
complete overhaul to make her seaworthy. In West, the Court stated
that the seaworthiness of a ship is not warranted when the ship is
"out of navigation," undergoing extensive repairs, and when control
of the entire ship has been surrendered by the shipowner. The Court
further concluded that the question of whether the work being done
by the injured man was traditionally that of a seaman should not be
reached until the status of the ship, whether it is in or out of navigation, had first been decided. The question of when a ship is to be
considered "out of navigation" was somewhat clarified by the Court
in 1961 in Roper v. United States," 2 where a ship being used as a
floating warehouse was held to be out of navigation. The concept of
"out of navigation," then, apparently includes vessels deactivated for
extensive repairs and those converted to non-maritime uses. The concept has not been further clarified by the Supreme Court but has been
applied and somewhat clarified by the lower courts."13
107. See, e.g., Deffes v. Federal Barge Lines, Inc., 361 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1966)

(use of specialized equipment does not preclude liability); Huff v. Matson Navigation Co., 338 F.2d 205 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 943 (1964) (same). Contra,
Partridge v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 456 (N.D. Cal. 1965) (warranty not
applied to land-based surveyor utilizing specialized professional skills aboard).
108. M. NORRIS, MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES § 51, at 113 (2d ed. 1966).
109. 358 U.S. 625 (1959).
110. The Court also stated that in admiralty there would be no distinction made,
as at common law, between business invitee and licensee and that a shipowner must
exercise reasonable care toward anyone rightfully aboard his ship. His duty, if any,
to trespassers was not mentioned. 358 U.S. at 630-32.
111. 361 U.S. 118 (1959).
112. 368 U.S. 20 (1961).
113. See Latus v. United States, 277 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1960) (warranty does not
attach to parts of a vessel as they return to service) ; Lawlor v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 275 F.2d 599 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 844 (1960) ; Schell v. Chesapeake
& 0. Ry., 264 F. Supp. 484 (E.D. Va. 1967); Lupo v. Consolidated Mariners, Inc.,
261 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Landry v. M.&W. Marine Ways, Inc., 257 F.
Supp. 45 (E.D. La. 1966).
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Finally, in Gutierrez v. Waterman Steamship Corp.," 4 a longshoreman injured ashore while unloading was allowed to recover for
unseaworthiness. The question of when loading and unloading begin
and end ashore was not discussed by the Court and has been the subject
of litigation in the lower courts."8
The class of persons covered by the doctrine of unseaworthiness
has been extended somewhat beyond Supreme Court decisions by
lower courts. For example, the warranty has been applied to a man
working aboard a fishing vessel as a joint-venturer sharing in the
catch," 6 to a volunteer crew member working without pay on a pleasure yacht,"17 and to a seaman who procured his job through fraud.""
Thus, the development of the law of unseaworthiness has been
characterized almost uniformly by an expansion of coverage. Our
purpose is now to examine in more detail the present state of the law
of unseaworthiness, focusing particularly upon one limitation that has
been placed on the doctrine by a majority of the lower federal courts.
LIMITATIONS

ON THE DOCTRINE

The expansion of the unseaworthiness doctrine examined in the
last section illustrates the myriad of situations in which unseaworthiness may be found. In Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc.,' 9 however,
the Supreme Court stated that a shipowner is not obligated to furnish
an accident-free ship but rather has the absolute duty only to furnish
a vessel and its appurtenances reasonably fit for their intended use. 20
Thus, the expansion of the doctrine of unseaworthiness has stopped
short of making shipowners insurers of every injury aboard ship,
except to the extent of a seaman's maintenance and cure, and judgments for defendants in seaworthiness cases are in fact still not uncommon. Let us now turn to an examination of limitations placed
on the shipowner's unseaworthiness liability.
Before liability for unseaworthiness will attach, it must be demonstrated that an unseaworthy condition existed and that it was the
cause, though not necessarily the only cause, of injury.' " ' Thus,
liability is denied if the injury is caused by an unsafe condition that
is not proved to have been unseaworthy, or if the injury is caused,
not by an unseaworthy condition, but by something that is not considered a condition at all, such as an act or an unforeseeable outside agent.
114. 373 U.S. 206 (1963).
115. See Daniel v. Skibs A/S Hilda Knudsen, 368 F.2d 178 (3d Cir. 1966) ; Spann
v. Lauritzen, 344 F.2d 204 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 938 (1965), reh. denied,
382 U.S. 1000 (1966); Hagans v. Ellerman & Bucknall S.S. Co., 318 F.2d 563 (3d
Cir. 1963) ; Kent v. Shell Oil Co., 286 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1961) ; Drumbold v. Plovba,
260 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Va. 1966); Litwinowicz v. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co., 179 F.
Supp. 813 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
116. Clevenger v. Star Fish & Oyster Co., 325 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1963).
117. In re Read's Petition, 224 F. Supp. 241 (S.D. Fla. 1963).
118. Spinks v. United States Lines Co., 223 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
119. 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
120. Id. at 550.
121. Alaska S.S. Co. v. Garcia, 378 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1967) ; Arena v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 279 F.2d 186 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 895 (1960) ; Grillea v.
United States, 229 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1956).
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The burden of proof of the existence of an unseaworthy condi-

tion.2 2 and of its causal connection with injury12 is upon the plaintiff.

Sometimes, however, this burden is lightened. For example, to establish unseaworthiness a plaintiff must, in many cases, prove the unfitness of a ship's equipment. In such a case, if he can prove that his
injury was caused by a failure due to a defect,1 24 even if the defect
was latent, 25 he has proved his case. If, however, he cannot prove the
existence of a defect he may be allowed to invoke what has been
called a "sea-going res ipsa loquitur.' ' 1 26 Under this principle, an injured plaintiff need only prove that his injury was caused by a failure
of equipment and that the equipment was being used in a normal and
customary manner."' The burden then shifts to the defendant to
prove some exculpatory cause of failure, such as negligent operation
122. Titus v. The Santorini, 258 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1958); Reynolds v. Royal
Mail Lines, 254 F.2d 55 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 818 (1958) ; Freitas v.
Pacific-Atlantic S.S. Co., 218 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1955). It is possible that the burden
of proof has been or will be shifted to the defendant by a presumption of unseaworthiness. See Jackson v. S.S. King's Point, 276 F. Supp. 451 (E.D. La. 1967).
See also Venable v. A/S Det Forenede Dampskibsselskab, No. 11,799 (4th Cir., June
12, 1968) ; Sanderlin v. Martin, 373 F.2d 447 (4th Cir. 1967).
123. Arena v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 279 F.2d 186 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 895 (1960); Titus v. The Santorini, 258 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1958); Grillea v.
United States, 229 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1956).
124. Hudson Waterways Corp. v. Schneider, 365 F.2d 1012 (9th Cir. 1966) (loose
wiring in switch box) ; Mills v. Mitsubishi Shipping Co., 358 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1036 (1967) ("cotter key" fell out causing winch handle to
jerk) ; Vega v. The Malula, 291 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1961) (pin fell out of block) ;
Reddick v. McAllister Lighterage Line, 258 F.2d 297 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
908 (1958) (latent defect in board of cargo crate).
125. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946); Norfleet v. Isthmian
Lines, Inc., 355 F.2d 359 (2d Cir. 1966) ; Reddick v. McAllister Lighterage Line, 258
F.2d 297 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 908 (1958). In Bruszewski v. Isthmian S.S.
Co., 163 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 828 (1948), the court denied
recovery because a defect was obvious. This case is perhaps questionable in view of
the rule established by the Supreme Court that assumption of risk is no defense to
unseaworthiness liability, see note 32 supra and accompanying text, but may be an
example of what is meant by the rule that a seaman assumes the risk of his calling,
see note 31 supra. It follows a line of cases holding that the warranty of unseaworthiness does not apply to injuries from dangerous conditions which a seaman has been
sent to correct. See notes 140-43 infra and accompanying text.
126. Walker v. Harris, 335 F.2d 185, 193 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
930 (1964).
127. Marshall v. Ove Skou Rederi A/S, 378 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1967) (liability
for unexplained slip of steel beam from non-defective and customarily used sling);
Walker v. Harris, 335 F.2d 185 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 930 (1964) (liability
for injuries from exposure in lifeboat due to sinking of tug in foreseeable storm) ;
Texas Menhaden Co. v. Johnson, 332 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1964) (liability for injuries
from buckling of crane when no evidence that alleged snag of line on bottom was
unforeseeable); Van Carpals v. The S.S. American Harvester, 297 F.2d 9 (2d Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 865 (1962) (liability for unexplained escape of steam
while valve being dismantled); Sprague v. Texas Co., 250 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1957)
(liability for unexplained escape of steam while head of heater being dismantled)
Manhat v. United States, 220 F.2d 143 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 966 (1955)
(res ipsa only applies when accident unexplained; here evidence showed cause was
negligent operation). Apparently the burden is upon the plaintiff to prove that the
equipment was being used in a normal, expected way. See Titus v. The Santorini,
258 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1958) (no liability for injury caused by break of wire and
rope proved not defective for use where trier of fact apparently was undecided
whether negligent use at moment of injury caused break or earlier use rendered it
unsuitably weak and unseaworthy) ; Manhat v. United States, 220 F.2d 143 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 966 (1955) (no liability for injury caused by fall of lifeboat from davits where no direct evidence of customary use or negligence where
equipment not defective and only reasonably possible inference was that the lever had
been negligently moved).

MARYLAND

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. XXVIII

of the equipment 12 or the intervention of an outside force. 29 If, to
escape liability, the defendant relies on an intervening outside force, it
must also appear that the force causing the failure was unforeseeable.' 3 0
It has often been said that the standard of seaworthiness is not
perfection but only reasonable fitness. 18 There seems to be agreement
that the reasonable fitness standard requires that a vessel at least
meet the customary standards of the industry, but the cases are not
all clear as to whether a ship is necessarily seaworthy if it has met
customary standards when those standards are not felt to be sufficiently high. 8 ' Whatever the standard, certain types of conditions
128. Spinelli v. Isthmian S.S. Co., 326 F.2d 870 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 935 (1964) (no liability for injury caused by slip in winch's brake where winch
not defective and slip caused by improper operation); Puddu v. Royal Netherlands
S.S. Co., 303 F.2d 752 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 840 (1962) (no liability for
injury caused by buckling of boom where buckling caused by negligent operation);
Titus v. The Santorini, 258 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1958) (no liability for injury caused
by break of wire and rope proved not defective before use where trier of fact apparently was undecided whether negligent use at moment of injury caused break or
earlier use rendered it unsuitably weak and unseaworthy) ; Manhat v. United States,
220 F.2d 143 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 966 (1955) (no liability for injury
caused by fall of lifeboat from its davits where caused by negligence).
129. Walker v. Harris, 335 F2d 185 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 930
(1964) (dictum - but liability found because storm causing sinking was foreseeable) ;
Texas Menhaden Co. v. Johnson, 332 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1964) (dictum - but liability
found because alleged outside force, snag on sea bottom, was foreseeable).
130. See note 176 infra and accompanying text. Apparently the burden is upon
the defendant to prove that the force was not foreseeable. See Texas Menhaden Co.
v. Johnson, 332 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1964) (liability where no evidence that force
was unforeseeable).
131. Marshall v. Ove Skou Rederi A/S, 378 F.2d 193, 201 (5th Cir. 1967);
Manhat v. United States, 220 F.2d 143, 148 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 966
(1955); Berti v. Compagnie de Navigation Cyprien Fabre, 213 F.2d 397, 400 (2d
Cir. 1954) ; Doucette v. Vincent, 194 F.2d 834, 837-38 (1st Cir. 1952) ; Ivusich v.
Cunard White Star, Ltd., 65 F. Supp. 412, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1945). It has also been
said that evidence of the best or better equipment available is inadmissible "for the
purpose of fixing the defendants' substantive standard of conduct" but that such
evidence is admissible, in the discretion of the trial court, on the issue of the reasonable
fitness of the equipment used. Doucette v. Vincent, 194 F.2d 834, 838 (1st Cir. 1952).
It has also been held that evidence of the undertaking of improvements may
not be taken as an implied admission of unseaworthiness. Lester v. United States,
234 F.2d 625, 628 (2d Cir. 1956). Presumably the reason for this rule is that the
law does not wish to inhibit the undertaking of improvements by an evidentiary rule.
132. Most courts have adopted into the law of unseaworthiness the rule of The
T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932) (L. Hand, J.), a negligence case, that the
standard of reasonableness is not necessarily controlled by the customary standard of
the calling, since that standard may not be a reasonably safe one. E.g., Venable v.
A/S Det Forenede Dampskibsselskab, No. 11,799 (4th Cir., June 12, 1968) ; Marshall
v. Ove Skou Rederi A/S, 378 F.2d 193, 200 (5th Cir. 1967); June T., Inc. v. King,
290 F.2d 404, 406 (5th Cir. 1961) ; Beard v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 289 F.2d 201 (3d
Cir. 1961), re'd in part on other grounds sub nom., Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc.
v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355 (1962) ; Hanson v. Reiss S.S. Co., 184 F. Supp.
545 (D. Del. 1960) ; Casbon v. Stockyard S.S. Corp 173 F. Supp. 845 (E.D. La.
1959) ; Foley, A Survey of the Maritime Doctrine of Seaworthiness, 46 ORS. L. Rtv.
369, 416 (1967) ; 21 LA. L. Rtv. 755, 765 (1961). The Second Circuit, however,
though not explicitly stating that a trier of fact may never find unseaworthiness
despite compliance with the customary standards of the trade, seems definitely to lean
toward such a rule. In Poignant v. United States, 225 F.2d 595 (2d Cir. 1955), the
court stated that in view of the Supreme Court's Boudoin decision (no liability for
unseaworthiness if assailant equal in disposition and seamanship to ordinary man in
the calling), "so [too, a vessel] does not become unseaworthy by reason of a temporary condition caused by a transient substance if even so the vessel was as fit for
service as similar vessels in similar service." Id. at 598. In Nuzzo v. Rederi, A/S
Wallenco, 304 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1962), the court distinguished the T.I. Hooper on
its facts and stated that it was not sure whether that case had survived the Supreme
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aboard ship have been frequently found to be seaworthy even though
they were unsafe.
In the Mitchell case, the Supreme Court stated that even if the
unseaworthy condition were unavoidable by the exercise of due care,
a shipowner would not be relieved of liability for injuries caused by
that condition.' 3" The Court did not say, however, that the trier of
fact could not decide, in answer to the threshold question of seaworthiness, that the condition was reasonably fit, and thus not unseaworthy,
because it was unavoidable. Thus unsafe conditions have been found
to be seaworthy where they were found to be unavoidable.' 34 Similarly,
recovery has often been denied where injury was found to have been
caused by a risk inherent and usual in the operation undertaken.'
Court decisions in Boudoin and Mitchell which had divorced concepts of negligence
from unseaworthiness liability. On the other hand, the court did state:
There are doubtless many cases in which the condition causing the injury
was so unusual or, because of some hidden or unapparent defect, so clearly dangerous as to warrant the conclusion of unseaworthiness by the trier of fact, even
in the absence of direct evidence that it was not "within the usual and customary
standards" of comparable maritime activity.
Id. at 510 (quoting Boudoin).
Actually, the Supreme Court has not expressly stated the relation between
seaworthiness and the customary standard of the trade except where the fitness of a
person has been called into question. In Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S.
336 (1955), a case of assault by a fellow crew member, the Court stated, "Was the
it
assault within the usual and customary standards of the calling? . . . If it is ....
is one of the risks of the sea that every crew takes." Id. at 340. The Court went on
to hold that, "the District Court was justified in concluding that [the assailant] was
not equal in disposition to the ordinary men of that calling and that the crew with
[him] as a member was not competent to meet the contingencies of the voyage." Id.
The Court also stated that it saw "no reason to draw a line between the ship and the
gear on the one hand and the ship's personnel on the other." Id. at 339. But the
standard of the trade was apparently not questioned in the case, since the assailant
had not even met that standard. We do not, therefore, really know the position of the
Supreme Court on the issue of whether or not the customary standard always controls.
In Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31 (1962), the Court did hold that
a ship could be found unseaworthy without the introduction of expert testimony of
customary marine architecture and that such evidence, if introduced, would not necessarily control, but the decision may be taken as meaning only that expertise is not
necessary and that the issue of customary equippage can be decided by an unassisted
lay jury.
It is clear, however, from all of the above cases, that evidence of customary
standards is admissible on the issue of reasonable fitness, and it appears that the
customary standard is at least the minimum standard of fitness if it is found to be
settled, definite, uniform, and widely followed. Foley, A Survey of the Maritime
Doctrine of Seaworthiness, 46 ORE. L. Rnv. 369, 416 (1967). It seems apparent, also,
that if a customary standard is reasonable, it will absolve a shipowner from unseaworthiness liability if it is followed, just as it will condemn him if it is breached. Id.
Evidence of violations of Coast Guard regulations, Foley, A Survey of the
Maritime Doctrine of Seaworthiness, 46 OR. L. R~v. 369, 417-18 (1967), and of the
Secretary of Labor's safety and health regulations for longshoring, 29 C.F.R. § 1504
(1968), promulgated under the authority of 33 U.S.C. § 941 (1964), Provenza v.
American Export Lines, Inc., 324 F.2d 660 (4th Cir. 1963), is also relevant to the
issue of the standard of unseaworthiness.
133. See notes 85-86 supra and accompanying text.
134. Ezekiel v. Volusia S.S. Co., 297 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S.
843, reh. denied, 369 U.S. 891 (1962) (not unseaworthy merely because rust accumulated and had to be removed) ; Holley v. The Manfred Stansfield, 186 F. Supp. 212
(E.D. Va. 1960) (dictum: not unseaworthy where potash cargo unavoidably solidified
due to hygroscopic nature - held: unseaworthy on other grounds); Garrison v.
United States, 121 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Cal. 1954) (not unseaworthy from wet deck
where deck being washed by sea). But see Schell v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 395 F.2d
676 (4th Cir. 1968), rev'g 264 F. Supp. 484 (E.D. Va. 1967).
135. Nuzzo v. Rederi, A/S Wallenco, 304 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1962) (no liability
for injury caused by slip into hole between pieces of lumber being unloaded, where
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Thus a ship is not rendered unseaworthy because its deck is necessarily slippery while being washed by seamen 3 6 or by waves." 7 While
it might be argued that a slippery deck is an obviously unsafe condition, recovery is denied on the grounds that a ship need be only
reasonably fit and that the existence of certain reasonably unavoidable
risks does not render a ship unseaworthy. Such risks are presumably
included within the rule that a seaman assumes the risks of his calling
but not of unseaworthy conditions.138 Such reasoning is not always
accepted, however, as was demonstrated by a case in the Fifth Circuit.. 9 in which a steel beam slipped from its sling and caused injury.
The sling was of a type customarily used in the trade which was being
used in the customary manner and which did not "break." The shipowner was held liable on the grounds that the sling failed to perform
its intended function and was therefore unseaworthy. A dissenting
judge argued, to no avail, that an occasional slip was customary and
inherent in the operation and was therefore to be expected. As a
result, he contended, the sling and vessel were reasonably fit.
A factual situation analogous to that of a danger inherent in an
operation, or unavoidable generally, is that of an injury caused by a
condition which the injured plaintiff was sent to repair or correct. A
rule has been established' 4" which denies liability in such a case; this
rule is presumably still accepted in at least the Third Circuit.' 4 ' The
42
definite trend, however, has been either to reject the rule outright
or to restrict it to cases of injury resulting from the same part or
defect of an appliance that the plaintiff was assigned to repair.' 43
gaps and holes inevitable) ; Lind v. American Trading & Prod. Corp., 294 F.2d 342
(9th Cir. 1961) (not unseaworthy when deck necessarily slippery while being
washed) ; Hooper v. Terminal S.S. Co., 296 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1961) (not unseaworthy when cargo shifted where shifting was inherent condition of unloading deck
cargo); Garrison v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Cal. 1954) (not unseaworthy from wet deck where deck being washed by sea); Ivusich v. Cunard
White Star, Ltd., 65 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1945) (not unseaworthy where new
winch operated stiffly as new winches usually do) ; ef. Marshall v. Ove Skou Rederi
A/S, 378 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1967) (dissenting opinion argued against unseaworthiness where risk of steel beam slipping from sling was inherent in operation). But see
Schell v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 395 F.2d 676 (4th Cir. 1968), rev'g, 264 F. Supp. 484
(E.D. Va. 1967).
136. Lind v. American Trading & Prod. Corp., 294 F.2d 342 (9th Cir. 1961).
137. Garrison v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
138. See notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text.
139. Marshall v. Ove Skou Rederi A/S, 378 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1967).
140. Byars v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 155 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1946), apparently
overruled without mention in Van Carpals v. The S.S. American Harvester, 297 F.2d
9 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 865 (1962) (recovery for injury from steam
escaping from valve being repaired), and Sprague v. Texas Co., 250 F.2d 123 (2d Cir.
1957) (recovery for injury from steam escaping from heater head being repaired).
141. Mesle v. Kea S.S. Corp., 260 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
966 (1959) (dictum) ; Bruszewski v. Isthmian S.S. Co., 163 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1947),
cert. denied, 333 U.S. 828 (1948) (no recovery for injury caused by falling pulley
while clearing deck of broken boom). See also Patterson v. Esso Jamestown, 274 F.
Supp. 854, 859-60 (E.D. La. 1967).
142. Van Carpals v. The S.S. American Harvester, 297 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 369 U.S. 865 (1962) (recovery for injury from steam escaping from
valve being repaired) ; Sprague v. Texas Co., 250 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1957) (recovery
for injury from steam escaping from heater head being repaired); Schell v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 395 F.2d 676 (4th Cir. 1968) (recovery allowed for slip on grease
that plaintiff was sent to clean up).
143. Mesle v. Kea S.S. Corp., 260 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
966 (1959) (recovery allowed because plaintiff was repairing defect of structure other
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A common ground of unseaworthiness liability involves the acts
of a seaman14 4 or "substitute seaman" 4 5 who is unfit in seamanship
or in disposition, which cause injury to another. From time to time
a plaintiff, whose own acts alone caused his injuries, has attempted
to recover on the basis of his own unfitness as a seaman. Such attempts have always failed despite the fact that the plaintiff's acts,
which caused his own injury, may not have been negligent.' 46
Perhaps the most important limitation on the unseaworthiness
liability of shipowners is the doctrine of instant unseaworthiness.
Putting aside two 1967 decisions of the Supreme Court, which will
be discussed later, it seems to be the settled rule in some circuits that
a ship is not rendered unseaworthy merely by the presence aboard of
14 7
a man who acts negligently, even if his negligent acts cause injury.
It is also the rule that a ship is rendered unseaworthy if a man's act
causes an unseaworthy condition to arise which in turn causes injury
or if his act results from an unfit condition of his own person. An
act, then, is not itself considered to be an unseaworthy condition,
even if it is negligent. 4
It is the distinction between an act and a
condition which is the basis of the instant unseaworthiness doctrine,

and it is the difficulty of making this distinction and the questionable
than that causing injury). See also Hudson Waterways Corp. v. Schneider, 365 F.2d
1012 (9th Cir. 1966) (recovery for injury from defective wiring in switch box of
broken air compressor, other defects of which were being repaired - no statement as
to whether the rule was accepted but did not apply to facts, or was not accepted at all).
144. See Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955) ; Jones v. Lykes
Bros. S.S. Co., 204 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1953) ; Keen v. Overseas Tankship Corp., 194
F.2d 515 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 966 (1952).
145. See Smith v. Lauritzen, 201 F. Supp. 663 (E.D. Pa. 1962). See also Smith
v. Lauritzen, 356 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1966); Berti v. Compagnie de Navigation
Cyprien Fabre, 213 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1954).
146. Holmes v. Mississippi Shipping Co., 301 F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1962) (no
recovery where plaintiff seaman intentionally cut off his own hand during crazed fit) ;
Hill v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 267 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. La. 1967) (no
recovery where plaintiff injured because he was too fat to get through larger-thanstandard hatch without difficulty).
147. Note, The Doctrine of Unseaworthiness: Developing Restriction of the ActCondition Dichotomy, 21 RUTG Rs L. Rxv. 322, 332 (1966). See, e.g., Ezekiel v.
Volusia S.S. Co., 297 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 843, reh. denied,
369 U.S. 891 (1962) ; Pinto v. States Marine Corp., 296 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 843, reh. denied, 369 U.S. 891 (1962) ; Berti v. Compagnie de Navigation Cyprien Fabre, 213 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1954) ; Koleris v. S.S. Good Hope, 241
F. Supp. 967 (E.D. Va. 1965). These cases are merely cited as examples. They no
longer represent the position of the Second and Fourth Circuits which have presumably overruled them on this point. See Venable v. A/S. Det Forenede Dampskibsselskab, No. 11,799 (4th Cir., June 12, 1968); Alexander v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 382 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1967) ; Candiano v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 382
F.2d 961 (2d Cir. 1967).
148. See Chancy v. City of Galveston, 368 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1966) (plaintiff's
own negligence) ; Puddu v. Royal Netherlands S.S. Co., 303 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 840 (1962); Williams v. The S.S. Richard De Larrinaga, 287
F.2d 732 (4th Cir. 1961) (plaintiff's own negligence) ; Donovan v. Esso Shipping Co.,
259 F.2d 65 (3d Cir. 1958) (same) ; Imperial Oil, Ltd. v. Drlik, 234 F.2d 4 (6th Cir.
1956) ; Nunes v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 227 F.2d 619 (1st Cir. 1955) (remanded for
finding of whether cause of injury was plaintiff's own negligence or an unseaworthy
condition). The Puddu and Williams cases have presumably been overruled by cases
eliminating consideration of an act-condition distinction. See Venable v. A/S Det
Forenede Dampskibsselskab, No. 11,799 (4th Cir., June 12, 1968); Alexander v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 382 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1967) ; Candiano v. Moore-McCormack
Lines, Inc., 382 F.2d 961 (2d Cir. 1967).
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grounds for doing so at all that have been the causes of considerable
controversy in recent years.
The phrase itself -

"instant unseaworthiness"

-

stems from

the concept that, though an act may be considered an instantaneous
condition, liability will not attach for such a short-lived "condition."14' 9
149. The act-condition distinction was probably first expressly articulated in
Grillea v. United States, 232 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1956). The Ninth and Fifth Circuits
have adopted the "instant" or "instantaneous" unseaworthiness doctrine by name. See
Alaska S.S. Co. v. Garcia, 378 F.2d 153, 155-56 (9th Cir. 1967); Antoine v. Lake
Charles Stevedores, Inc., 376 F.2d 443, 445 (5th Cir. 1967). The Ninth Circuit,
however, has expressed doubts as to the validity of the doctrine in view of the trend
of recent Supreme Court cases, and has stated that it now applies the doctrine cautiously. Alaska S.S. Co. v. Garcia, supra. While apparently not choosing to use the
name "instant unseaworthiness," the Second Circuit had adopted the act-condition
distinction though it was troubled by the difficulty of making that distinction. See
Radovich v. Cunard S.S. Co., 364 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1966). The Second Circuit, however, has now rejected the act-condition distinction, feeling itself compelled to do so by
the Supreme Court's decision in Mascuilli v. United States, 387 U.S. 237 (1967). See
Alexander v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 382 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1967) ; Candiano v.
Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 382 F.2d 961 (2d Cir. 1967). For a discussion of
these Supreme Court and Second Circuit decisions see notes 213-40 infra and accompanying text.
The First, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits have apparently not explicitly adopted
even the act-condition distinction, but have adopted what amounts to the same thing
in distinguishing between unseaworthy equipment (liability) and improper use of
seaworthy equipment (no liability), or between unseaworthiness (liability) and operational negligence (no liability). See Scott v. Inbrandtsen Co., 327 F.2d 113 (4th
Cir. 1964) ; Arena v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 279 F.2d 186 (1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 895 (1960) ; Penedo Cia Naviera S.A. v. Maniatis, 262 F.2d 284 (4th Cir.
1959); Imperial Oil, Ltd. v. Drlik, 234 F.2d 4 (6th Cir. 1956). The Fourth Circuit's
Scott decision is puzzling. The court seems to toy with the idea of completely eliminating the distinction between unseaworthiness and operational negligence but really
goes no further than holding that an unsafe condition of cargo, rendered such by
an improper method of unloading, may be an unseaworthy condition, even though it
is transitory. The court does not deal with the question of instantaneous unsafe
conditions as exemplified by negligent acts continuing to the instant of injury. The
Scott decision has been interpreted by one court as eliminating the operational
negligence-unseaworthiness distinction, see Radovich v. Cunard S.S. Co., 364 F.2d
149, 151 (2d Cir. 1966), but has been interpreted more narrowly by the Fourth Circuit
itself, see Venable v. A/S Det Forenede Dampskibsselskab, No. 11,799 (4th Cir.,
June 12, 1968). In any case, the operational negligence-unseaworthiness distinction
has now been completely eliminated by the Fourth Circuit's decision in Venable,
interpreting the Supreme Court's Mascuilli opinion. See notes 213-40 infra and
accompanying text for a discussion of the Mascuilli case and cases interpreting it.
The position of the Third Circuit is unclear. It seemed that the court had
discarded the act-condition distinction in favor of a policy of holding shipowners
liable for unseaworthiness for injury caused by the negligent use of seaworthy equipment See Thompson v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 331 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1964) ; Ferrante v.
Swedish American Lines, 331 F.2d 571 (3d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 801
(1964). In Ferrante the court stated that this policy was indicated by the trend of
recent Supreme Court cases. In both of these cases, however, the same result
(liability for unseaworthiness) might have been reached under the act-condition distinction, since in both cases an unseaworthy condition could have been found in an
unsafe apparatus made from seaworthy equipment or in an unsafe method or course
of conduct. Having presumably rejected the act-condition distinction, though in
dictum, the Third Circuit surprisingly affirmed a district court decision for a defendant shipowner which was grounded on a distinction between operational negligence and unseaworthiness. See Mascuilli v. United States, 358 F.2d 133 (3d Cir.
1966). The Third Circuit has apparently not yet interpreted the Supreme Court's
reversal of its Mascuilli affirmance, as have the Second and Fourth Circuits.
For a discussion of what is said to be the "erosion" of the act-condition
distinction and a prediction of its demise see Note, The Doctrine of Unseaworthiness:
Developing Restriction of the Act-Condition Dichotomy, 21 RUTGERs L. REv. 322
(1967). See also Note, The Doctrine of Unseaworthinessin the Lower Federal Courts,
76 HARv. L. Rxv. 819 (1963).
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In view of the seaman's remedy for negligence provided by the Jones
Act and the business invitee's common law remedy for negligence,
it might seem that the negligence-unseaworthiness or act-condition
distinction is of little practical importance. Even if an act could itself
constitute unseaworthiness, cases in which such an act would not also
be negligent would probably be rather rare. Of importance, however, is the fact that injuries aboard ship are often caused by persons,
such as longshoremen or other harbor workers, for whose negligent
acts shipowners are not vicariously liable.' 50 Thus, if injury to a
seaman is caused by the act of a person for whom the shipowner is
not legally responsible, the injured seaman could well find himself with
a remedy, for which he must prove fault, only against a party perhaps
less able to pay damages than the shipowner. If, however, such a
person causes an unseaworthy condition to arise, which in turn causes
injury to the seaman, the shipowner is liable. Under similar circumstances, an injured harbor worker would find himself required to
prove the fault of a third-party tort-feasor, or would have to accept
his probably less lucrative compensation remedy, if that third party's
act caused his injury, but could recover from the shipowner if that
act created an unseaworthy condition which caused his injury. The
act-condition distinction, then, may be of great importance to injured
plaintiffs and to shipowners.
Another situation in which the act-condition distinction may
prove important is that in which a plaintiff has caused his own injury.
It is clear that where it is found that the sole cause of injury was an
act of the plaintiff himself, he is denied recovery for unseaworthiness, 151 and, indeed, unless he is covered by a compensation statute,
he is without a remedy of any kind. Where the act-condition distinction is drawn in such a case, liability is denied because of the absence
of an unseaworthy condition. If the plaintiff's act is found to have
been negligent, then unseaworthiness recovery may also be denied on
the alternative ground of contributory negligence. Though contributory negligence is usually not a bar to recovery for unseaworthiness,
but rather goes only to mitigate damages, 5 2 damages would be mitigated 100% in such a case. 1 13 On the other hand, recovery has been
allowed where it was assumed that the plaintiff caused or helped cause
150. The shipowner would, of course, be liable for the injury, however, if the
negligence of one of his own employees or some unseaworthy condition also concurrently contributed to the causation of the injury. See Note, Unseaworthiness,
OperationalNegligence, and the Death of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, 43 Noras DAmP LAWYER 550, 558 (1968).

151. See, e.g., Chaney v. City of Galveston, 368 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1966);
Guarrancino v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 333 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 946 (1964); Rawson v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 304 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1962);
Williams v. The S.S. Richard De Larrinaga, 287 F.2d 732 (4th Cir. 1961) ; Donovan
v. Esso Shipping Co., 259 F.2d 65 (3d Cir. 1958); Nunes v. Farrell Lines, 227 F.2d
619 (1st Cir. 1955) ; Taylor v. S.S. Helen Lykes, 268 F. Supp. 932 (E.D. La. 1967).

Guarranicinoand Williams may no longer be authoritative in view of the Second and
Fourth Circuits' decisions in Venable v. A/S Det Forenede Dampskibsselskab, No.
11,799 (4th Cir., June 12, 1968) ; Alexander v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 382 F.2d 963
(2d Cir. 1967); and Candiano v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 382 F.2d 961 (2d

Cir. 1967), which reject the act-condition distinction.
152. See note 34 supra.
153. Donovan v. Esso Shipping Co., 259 F.2d 65 (3d Cir. 1958).
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an unseaworthy condition to arise, which in turn caused his injury. 154
The law is not settled, however, as to whether damages must be
totally mitigated where a plaintiff's negligent acts have been the sole
cause of the creation of an unseaworthy condition which, in turn,
caused his injury. One case has held that in such a situation damages need not be totally mitigated, 155 but this view has been criticized.
If the former view prevails, however, the act-condition distinction is
of great importance to plaintiffs who cause their own injuries, for
the distinction will determine if damages are to be mitigated 100%.
It is clear, then, that the act-condition distinction, if made, is
important to the law of unseaworthiness. Putting aside, again, discussion of recent Supreme Court decisions that may have eliminated
the basis of this distinction, let us examine the distinction to see if it
should be eliminated from the law.
The act-condition distinction has proved difficult to draw.'5 6 It
has apparently been discarded in the Second, Third and Fourth Circuits' 5 7 and has been questioned elsewhere. 158 In deference to the
critics of the distinction, it does seem that a ship which has aboard
a man who does not use the care of a reasonable man under the circumstances is in some sense inadequate. 5 9 If this reasoning is the
ground for allowing acts to be the basis of a finding of unseaworthiness, then a finding of unseaworthiness based on an act will require a
prior determination of negligence. Perhaps making unseaworthiness
liability turn on a finding of negligence is justified where no other
unseaworthy condition exists and injury is caused solely by an act.
To draw the seaworthiness-unseaworthiness line at negligence, however, would require that the difficult act-condition distinction still
be made, since it is clear that unreasonably unsafe conditions give
154. Thompson v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 331 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 913 (1964) (dictum); Knox v. United States Lines Co., 294 F.2d 354
(3d Cir. 1961) (judgment for defendant reversed and new trial awarded to plaintiff
without adverting to fact that plaintiff may have helped cause the condition by
helping to unload unevenly) ; Grillea v. United States, 232 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1956)
(recovery granted although it was assumed that plaintiff and fellow servant were
persons who misplaced cover on hatch through which plaintiff fell); Holley v. The
Manfred Stansfield, 186 F. Supp. 212 (E.D. Va. 1960) (recovery granted although
plaintiff was using "payloader" contrary to instructions and created overhang of
solidified potash that later fell on him).
155. Holley v. The Manfred Stansfield, 186 F. Supp. 212 (E.D. Va. 1960). Contra,
Donovan v. Esso Shipping Co., 259 F.2d 65 (3d Cir. 1958). The Holley decision has
been discussed in Cavelleri v. Isthmian Lines, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1961),
where it was said that if the case is interpreted as holding that the plaintiff could
recover because his negligence activated a latently unsafe condition, then the decision
is proper in mitigating damages only 50%, but that if the case is interpreted as
holding that the plaintiff's negligence was the sole cause of the unseaworthy condition
which caused his injury, then the case reached an anomalous result.
156. Radovich v. Cunard S.S. Co., 364 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1966) (majority and
dissent agree on difficulties) ; Skibinski v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 360 F.2d 539 (2d
Cir. 1966) (dissenting opinion); Forkin v. Furness Withy & Co., 323 F.2d 638 (2d
Cir. 1963). The court in Taylor v. S.S. Helen Lykes, 268 F. Supp. 932 (E.D. La.
1967), stated, however, that although the distinction was difficult to articulate verbally,
it was workable when applied to facts.
157. See note 149 supra.
158. See Alaska S.S. Co. v. Garcia, 378 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1967); M. NORRIS,
MARITIMI

PXRSONAL INJuRrgs

§ 38, at 79-80 (2d ed. 1966).

159. See Note, The Doctrine of Unseaworthiness: Developing Restriction of the
Act-Condition Dichotomy, 21 RUTGXRS L. Rxv. 322, 338 (1967).
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rise to unseaworthiness liability whether negligently' or innocently. 6 '
created. It seems that the difficulty of making the act-condition distinction causes considerable litigation in this area of the law and that
only by totally eliminating the distinction will this burden on courts
and litigants be significantly reduced. It has also been argued that the
act-condition distinction should be completely discarded, and not pinned
to a finding of negligence, because, from the standpoint of the plaintiff,
at the instant of injury a vessel may be every bit as dangerous as a
result of an act, whether negligent or not, as it would have been as a
result of some condition that had existed for a longer period of time.6 2
Moreover, to make unseaworthiness liability for acts turn on a finding
of negligence would presumably run afoul of the Supreme Court's
command that there be a "complete divorcement of unseaworthiness
63
liability from concepts of negligence."'
Since acts causing injury aboard ship are often performed by
men for whose acts, even if negligent, the shipowner is not presently
liable, unless they create unseaworthy conditions, the effect of abandoning the act-condition distinction will necessarily be to increase the
liability of shipowners. This would seem to be a logical extension of
the present rule, however, since the shipowner is already liable for
unseaworthy conditions created or brought aboard by such persons
despite the shipowner's lack of fault or relinquishment of control. 64
Before the distinction is discarded on theoretical grounds, however,
it would be well to consider that the increased burden on the shipowner would be substantial in view of the fact that he is also liable
for injury, caused by unseaworthiness, to harbor workers and that danger to harbor workers, particularly longshoremen, is great even when
their duties are performed on a ship free of unseaworthy conditions.
Whether or not the act-condition distinction should be drawn, in
actual practice it has proved difficult to draw. Some factual situations
clearly exhibit the existence of a condition causing injury; many of
these have been pointed out above in the section discussing the expansion of the doctrine. In other factual situations, however, the
act-condition line is extremely difficult to draw.
Courts have stated that the act-condition issue is to be decided
by determining whether or not the act in question has ended, or come
to rest, before the injury occurred.' 65 One line of reasoning, which
goes far to obliterate the distinction between act and condition, is the
rule that if an unsafe act is performed pursuant to a plan, method,
160. See Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
161. See Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960).

162. M. NoRRs, MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIS § 38, at 77 (2d ed. 1966). See also
Note, The Doctrine of Unseaworthiness:Developing Restriction of the Act-Condition
Dichotomy, 21 RuTcIRs L. Rsv. 322, 337-38 (1967).

163. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960).
164. See notes 76-81 supra and accompanying text.
165. Robichaux v. Kerr McGee Oil Industries, Inc., 376 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1967)
Antoine v. Lake Charles Stevedores, Inc., 376 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1967) ; Radovich v.
Cunard S.S. Co., 364 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1966); Beeler v. Alaska Aggregate Corp.,
336 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1964) ; Billeci v. United States, 298 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1962) ;
Note, The Doctrine of Unseaworthiness in the Lower Federal Courts, 76 HARV. L.
Rev. 819 (1963).
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or course of operation put into execution prior to injury, then the
operative act is the initiation of the plan. Since the act of initiation
would have come to rest prior to injury, it is reasoned that the injury
was caused by a condition, not by an act. This line of reasoning is
found, in varying degrees, in a number of decisions by federal courts.'6 6
These cases all involve the use of equipment not in itself defective,
but dangerous because of the way in which it has been or is being
used. They run the factual gamut from static positioning of equipment in an unsafe manner, such as an unsteady pile of auto chassis
dangerous when stepped upon,'6 7 to an active use of equipment in an
unsafe manner, such as lifting four bales in a load safe for only two. 6 '
The problem in these cases is the difficulty of deciding whether an
unsafe act is an aberration of an otherwise safe plan, or the beginning of a new, unsafe plan, 6 9 or whether there has been faulty
execution of a safe plan or adequate execution of an unsafe plan. 17
There is also a question of the effect of the consideration of whether
the plan was
originated by the actor, the supervisor or possibly a
x17
third party.
The picture is further clouded by those cases which have held
that injury caused by an improvident order by a superior does not
give rise to unseaworthiness liability unless the superior is found to
have been incompetent. 72 What is the distinction between injuries
caused by acts performed pursuant to a plan and those caused by
acts performed pursuant to an order? Is not an order, at least usually,
the embodiment of a plan, and does not the negligent act of the
superior come to rest in the form of an unseaworthy condition when
the words of the order have been uttered and the subordinate is
about to act pursuant to them?
It would seem then that a distinction which allows a trier of
fact to arbitrarily interpret a single factual situation as either an
unsafe use of seaworthy equipment, not giving rise to liability, or as
an unsafe method of operation or condition of non-defective equip166. Morales v. City of Galveston, 370 U.S. 165 (1962) (dictum - method or
manner); Radovich v. Cunard S.S. Co., 364 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1966) (plan);
Blassingill v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 336 F.2d 367 (9th Cir. 1964) (course of conduct) ;
Thompson v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 331 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
913 (1964) (method); Scott v. Isbrandtsen Co., 327 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1964)
(method); Rich v. Ellerman & Bucknall S.S. Co., 278 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1960)
(manner); Robillard v. A.L. Burbank & Co., Ltd., 186 F. Supp. 193 (S.D.N.Y.
1960) (method).
167. See Rich v. Ellerman & Bucknall S.S. Co., 278 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1960).
168. See Blassingill v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 336 F.2d 367 (9th Cir. 1964).
169. See Radovich v. Cunard S.S. Co., 364 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1966); Spinelli v.
Isthmian S.S. Co., 326 F.2d 870 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 935 (1964).
170. See Radovich v. Cunard S.S. Co., 364 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1966); Blassingill
v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 336 F.2d 367 (9th Cir. 1964); Taylor v. S.S. Helen Lykes,
268 F. Supp. 932 (E.D. La. 1967).
171. 41 ST. JOHN's L. Riv. 602, 609 (1967) (noting Radozich).
172. Pinto v. States Marine Corp., 296 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 843, reh. denied, 369 U.S. 891 (1962) ; Koleris v. S.S. Good Hope, 241 F. Supp.
967 (E.D. Va. 1965); G. GILMORx & C. BLACK, TBi LAW oF ADMIRALTY § 6-39,
at 320 (1957) : "The only case which is today clearly outside the scope of the unseaworthiness doctrine is the almost theoretical construct of an injury whose only cause
is an order improvidently given by a concededly competent officer on a ship admitted
to be in all respects seaworthy." But see Di Salvo v. Cunard S.S. Co., 171 F. Supp.
813 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (captain's order caused unseaworthy course of conduct).
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ment, giving rise to liability, is a distinction without a difference. It
would seem more reasonable to merely look to the cause of injury
as a whole, regardless of what it might consist, and decide if it was
unreasonably unsafe.
Perhaps the basis of the instant unseaworthiness doctrine is not
merely the act-condition distinction but rather the distinction between
an unseaworthy condition and any other causative factor. As mentioned earlier, in Morales v. City of Galveston173 the Supreme Court
affirmed a judgment of no liability for injury from noxious fumes
from the last "shot" of grain loaded into a hold, despite the fact that
the ship was not equipped with ventilators. The Court characterized
the cause of injury as an unforeseeable outside agent. Accepting this
characterization, the result is logical, for an unforeseeable outside
agent cannot, by definition, be an unseaworthy condition of a vessel
since it is an outside agent; moreover, since a ship need be only
reasonably fit for its intended use, activity to overcome an unforeseeable outside agent cannot, by definition, be an intended use. The
close question in Morales, however, was whether the noxious fumes
from the cargo were an outside agent or a condition of the ship. The
Court did not mention the instant unseaworthiness doctrine, but the
majority opinion in the court below referred to the fact that the vessel
was only instantaneously unfit."7 4 Thus Morales may be interpreted
as an application of the instant unseaworthiness doctrine.' 5 It would
seem, then, that the rule can be stated thusly: if an unforeseeable
outside agent creates an unseaworthy condition aboard ship which in
turn creates injury, the shipowner is liable. Moreover, it seems logical
to conclude that a vessel's facing of a foreseeable and avoidable dangerous agent or force, from without or within, and its failure to overcome it, is an unseaworthy condition of the vessel; some lower courts
have so held. 1 76 It would seem, then, that even if the act-condition
distinction is discarded, a distinction must still be made between an
unseaworthy condition of a vessel and an unforeseeable outside agent
that instantaneously exerts its harmful influence aboard ship.
THE SUPREME COURT AND INSTANT
UNSEAWORTHINESS

A number of judges have stated that recent decisions by the

177
Supreme Court have undermined the act-condition distinction.

Though this view may be supported by the general trend of recent
decisions towards ever-widening coverage, the Court has never ex173. 370 U.S. 165 (1962).
174. Morales v. City of Galveston, 291 F.2d 97, 98 (5th Cir. 1961).
175. See notes 147-49 supra and accompanying text.
176. See Marshall v. Ove Skou Rederi A/S, 378 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1967);
Walker v. Harris, 335 F.2d 185 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 930 (1964) ; Texas
Menhaden Co. v. Johnson, 332 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1964). See also Morales v. City of
Galveston, 370 U.S. 165 (1962) (the dissent argued that the ship was unseaworthy because it was unfit to protect against outside agent which dissent felt was foreseeable).
177. See Alaska S.S. Co. v. Garcia, 378 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1967); Ferrante v.
Swedish American Lines, 331 F.2d 571 (3d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 801 (1964).
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plicitly adopted or rejected the distinction.17 The Court perhaps came
closest to expressly distinguishing acts from conditions in its 1903
decision in the The Osceola,1 79 where it distinguished between operational negligence and unseaworthiness. Other decisions of the Court
have avoided the issue, but have not found unseaworthiness in cases
where an unsafe condition could not be found. In Boudoin v. Lykes
Bros. Steamship Co.,' the Court allowed recovery for injury caused
by a willful act of assault, but stated that recovery was allowed only
because the assailant was found to be unequal in disposition to the
ordinary man of the calling, an unseaworthy condition. In Crumady
v. The Joachin Hendrik Fisser'8 the Court awarded recovery for
injury caused by the improper use of proper equipment, but the facts
were such that the acts of usage were found to have rendered the
condition of the equipment unsafe. Finally, in Morales v. City of
Galveston,"2 the Court did state that unseaworthiness could be found
in an improper manner or method of doing something, but it is reasonable to assume that the Court was speaking of a manner or method
that could be interpreted, not as an act, but as a condition.
Two recent Supreme Court decisions, Waldron v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc.' and Mascuilli v. United States,"4 have left ambiguous the Court's position on the act-condition distinction. The
Waldron decision extended the scope of the unseaworthiness doctrine
by resolving a specific conflict among the circuits,1 5 but this conflict
presumably did not involve the act-condition distinction. Petitioner
was a member of the crew of respondent's ship. He and four other
seamen were engaged in a docking operation at the stern of the vessel
as it approached a pier. At the last minute the mate in charge was
ordered to ready an additional mooring line. He ordered the petitioner and one other crewman to uncoil a heavy eight-inch line and
carry it to the side of the ship. While uncoiling the line petitioner
fell and injured his back. At the trial, "[t]here was expert evidence 8 6
to the effect that three or four men rather than two were required to
carry the line in order to constitute 'safe and prudent seamanship'."' 87
Petitioner's only contentions were that the mate's assignment of too
few men to do the particular job of uncoiling and carrying the line
178. Antoine v. Lake Charles Stevedores, Inc., 376 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1967)

Radovich v. Cunard S.S. Co., 364 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1966) (dissenting opinion).
179. 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
180. 348 U.S. 336 (1955).
181. 358 U.S. 423 (1959).
182. 370 U.S. 165 (1962).
183. 386 U.S. 724 (1967).
184. 387 U.S. 237 (1967).
185. Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court in order to resolve a supposed
conflict between the Waldron decision in the Second Circuit and that of American
President Lines, Ltd. v. Redfern, 345 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1965), and other cases noted
by the Court in 386 U.S. at 724 n.2.
186. The Supreme Court has held that expert testimony of customary equippage
is not required for a finding of unseaworthiness and, if offered, does not conclusively
decide the issue. Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 21, 37 n.6 (1962). For
a discussion of the relation of customary standards to unseaworthiness liability see
note 132 supra and accompanying text.
187. Waldron v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 386 U.S. 724, 725 (1967) (footnote added), quoting below, Waldron v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 356 F.2d 247,
248 (2d Cir. 1966) (same).
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constituted negligence and that the assignment of too few men in this

situation rendered the vessel unseaworthy. The United States district court allowed the issue of negligence to go to the jury, which
found that there had been no negligence, but the court granted a
directed verdict for defendant on the issue of unseaworthiness. The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, with one judge
dissenting, stating that there can be no unseaworthiness recovery for
injury caused solely by an act or omission of a competent crew member and holding, more narrowly, that there can be no unseaworthiness

recovery for injury caused solely by an order of a competent ship's
officer. The court's statement is essentially a restatement of the
instant unseaworthiness doctrine, and its holding is a more specific
rule within that doctrine.
The Supreme Court reversed; speaking for the Court, Mr. justice
Black stated: "The basic issue here is whether there is any justification, consistent with the broad remedial purposes of the doctrine of
unseaworthiness, for drawing a distinction between the ship's equipment, on the one hand, and its personnel, on the other."' 88 The Court
concluded that there was no justification for drawing such a line in the
present case. It noted that had the cause of injury been an order to
lift the line by means of defective equipment, sound equipment improperly used, or incompetent help, the ship would have been rendered
unseaworthy, regardless of negligence, under existing precedent. 8 9
The Court reasoned, therefore, that the improper use of men rather
than equipment and the use of too few men rather than incompetent
men could constitute unseaworthiness as well. The Court also noted
that the availability of sufficient competent men elsewhere aboard

would not relieve the shipowner of the duty to provide sufficient competent men when and where the specific job was to be done.
In justification of its decision the Court stated that its analysis
was "required by a clear recognition of the needs of the seaman for
protection from dangerous conditions beyond his control and the role
of the unseaworthiness doctrine which, by shifting the risk to the shipowner, provides that protection."' 90 Referring to its own previous
decisions the Court stated that:
[W]e noted that "the hazards of maritime service, the helplessness
of the men to ward off the perils of unseaworthiness, the harsh188. 386 U.S.

at 726.
189. The Court here does not cite authority for this statement. Presumably the
Court was referring to such cases as Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman
Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355 (1962) (defective bands on bales); Alaska S.S. Co. v.
Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954) (defective snatch block); Seas Shipping Co. v.
Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946) (latently defective steel shackle) ; Mahnich v. Southern
S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944) (rotten rope) ; Crumady v. The J.H. Fisser, 358 U.S.
423 (1959) (improper setting on otherwise fit electric circuit breaker) ; Morales v.
City of Galveston, 370 U.S. 165 (1962) (dictum - improper method of loading);
Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955) (assault by an assailant not
equal in disposition or seamanship to ordinary men of the calling). Only in the
Mahnick case did the Court particularly refer to the fact that the unseaworthy condition found was caused by an order and in that case the unseaworthy defect was not
so much in the order as in the defective equipment used pursuant to it. In Waldron,
however, the situations used as examples of obviously unseaworthy conditions all
involved uses of men or equipment pursuant to an order or assignment.
190. 386 U.S. at 728.
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ness of forcing them to shoulder their losses alone, and the broad
range of the 'humanitarian policy' of the doctrine of unseaworthiness," ..

.

should prevent the shipowner from delegating, shifting,

or escaping his duty by using the men or gear of others to perform the ship's work. By the same token, the shipowner should not
be able to escape liability merely because he has used men rather
than machines or physical equipment to perform that work.'
In view of the expansion of the doctrine of unseaworthiness in
past decisions and the policy basis for that expansion, the Waldron
decision probably comes as no surprise to the admiralty bar. Although
some may disagree with the validity of these policy arguments and
the need to apply them in the instant situation, these policies seem to
be firmly entrenched in the thinking of at least a majority of the
Court.'9 2 It must be admitted that the distinction between too little
equipment and too few men is tenuous.' 93 The classic definition of seaworthiness, "a vessel reasonably suitable for her intended service,"'9 4
is certainly broad enough to encompass the fitness of procedures involving the use of men in general, and of too few men in particular,
and such uses pursuant to the orders of ship's officers.
Having decided that the assignment of too few men to do a particular job may be unseaworthiness, the Court in Waldron reasserted
the Mitchell doctrine that if a transitory unseaworthy condition is
found to have caused injury, then liability will attach whether the
condition was negligently or innocently created. The jury finding, that
the mate's order which created the potentially unseaworthy condition
was not negligently given, was held irrelevant to unseaworthiness liability, and the Court remanded the case for a jury determination of
the unseaworthiness issue.
The narrowest interpretation of the Waldron holding is that the
use, pursuant to an order, of too few men to do a particular job may
be an unseaworthy condition. Under this interpretation, the decision
is only a slight advancement of prior law and represents no basic
change in theory. The case of Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., discussed earlier, held that a defective rope used pursuant to an order
constituted unseaworthiness. There have been a number of cases in
which a method of carrying out what was termed a "plan" or "course
of conduct" was held to warrant a finding of an unseaworthy condition.
The Waldron decision went beyond those cases because it involved
only the use of personnel; wheren nnnnrntlh a!! r; or cases had
involved some element of equipment usage.
Perhaps the Waldron holding may be somewhat expanded to include as possible unseaworthy conditions all operations in which men
are improperly used or too few of them are used, even though the
191. Id.
192. The dissent's disagreement with the majority did not involve, at least
expressly, the policy rationale that should underlie the law of unseaworthiness. For a
discussion of the issue that was the point of disagreement see pp. 281-85 infra.
193. See 66 CoLUm. L. Rxv. 1180, 1182 (1966) (commenting on Waldron decision
by the Second Circuit).
194. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960). For a discussion
of other definitions of the concept see note 67 supra.
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operation is conducted spontaneously by the men and not pursuant
to an order. This interpretation would not seem overly broad since
unseaworthy conditions may be found in situations involving the use
of equipment where that use was not pursuant to an order. Perhaps,
also, the Waldron holding may be expanded to include as possible
unseaworthy conditions all operations in which anything causing injury is done pursuant to order. Although it is not entirely clear,
the decision would seem to overrule completely the rule formulated
in some prior cases,' 95 which the Second Circuit in Waldron had stated
as its holding, namely: "[I]f the shipowner has furnished a wellmanned ship, with a competent crew, there can be no liability for
personal injuries caused by an order of an officer of the ship that is
not proved to be such as would not have been made by a reasonably
prudent man under the circumstances."' 9 6 The Supreme Court's opinion in Waldron clearly indicates that at least in some enumerated
factual situations the fact that injury is caused by an order does not
relieve a shipowner of unseaworthiness liability. Though the Court
does not refer to the act-condition distinction, it may be presumed
that the Waldron decision at least stands for the proposition that an
order may cause an unseaworthy condition to arise in the use of equipment or personnel and that if such an unseaworthy condition is created,
the fact that it was caused by an order or that the order was not
negligently given is irrelevant. It is not clear, however, that the Court
has decided that all orders create conditions for which liability will
attach if they are found to be unseaworthy. Perhaps a factual situation might still arise where injury could be found to have been caused
by an order but where the order caused no condition to arise. The
Court's opinion, however, states that unseaworthiness may be found
where an order involves defective or improperly used equipment or
personnel. It would seem that this conclusion logically encompasses
all possible factual situations. If the order in Waldron caused an unsafe condition to arise as men set about to carry it out, then any order
could be as easily interpreted to have created a condition, unless
perhaps it could somehow be found that the order caused injury
instantaneously. It would seem, therefore, that in Waldron, the rule
that injuries caused by orders do not give rise to unseaworthiness
liability has been for all intents and purposes overruled. If this is
true, when injuries are caused by acts carried out pursuant to orders
the only question to be asked is whether the condition created by the
order was in fact unseaworthy.
The question remains, however, whether the Waldron case should
even be limited to conditions caused by orders. Quoting from the
opinion of the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court stated that the
holding of that court was: "If someone is injured solely by reason of
an act or omission on the part of any member of a crew found to be
possessed of the competence of men of his calling, there can be no
197
recovery unless the act or omission is proved to be negligent.'
195. See note 172 supra and accompanying text.
196. 356 F.2d at 251 (emphasis added).

197. 386

U.S. at 725, quoting below, 356 F.2d at 251.
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Though the Second Circuit's opinion included this statement, its express holding was stated more narrowly. The quotation which the
Supreme Court selected as the holding of the circuit court decision is
a statement of the instant unseaworthiness rule, except as it applies
to outside agents, though it does not expressly refer to the act-condition
distinction. By so stating the holding of the Second Circuit's decision
and then reversing that decision, has the Court overruled the instant
unseaworthiness doctrine? The Court did not do so expressly; indeed, after quoting the rule, the Court did not refer to it again but
stated only that the Second Circuit erred in failing to obey the Mitchell
command to divorce unseaworthiness liability from concepts of negligence. Since the reported facts seem to indicate that, upon remand,
a jury could find that the mate's order caused an unseaworthy
condition to arise, and since the Court seems to have taken issue
only with the Second Circuit's use of concepts of negligence, it would
seem that the Waldron decision should not be taken as impliedly
overruling the instant unseaworthiness doctrine. Long-established doctrines should not be deemed to be overruled by implication. The better,
more conservative view would be that the Waldron Court felt that
the Second Circuit had violated Mitchell by applying concepts of
negligence to a situation arguably involving, not merely an act causing
instantaneous injury, but a transitory unsafe condition. Under this
interpretation, upon remand, the jury must determine whether a condition was created and whether, without reference to the standard of
negligence, that condition rendered the vessel unseaworthy. What the
Supreme Court was probably trying to do in broadening the holding
below was to simply say that the condition question may go to the jury
whether or not the defective use of personnel resulted from an order.
An argument can be made, however, for a broader interpretation
of the Waldron holding which would not require that the jury be
asked whether a condition had been created. Since the Second Circuit
below treated the case as one involving injury caused solely by an act,
and since the Supreme Court did not expressly refer to the act-condition
distinction or state that the court of appeals' error was in failing to
see that an unsafe condition had been created, it can be argued that
the Court simply was not concerned with whether injury was caused
by what might be called an act and that its opinion indicates that
whenever injury is caused aboard ship, a plaintiff is to be given an
opportunity to have the trier of fact decide whether his injury was
caused by an unreasonable unfitness of the vessel, embodied in an
act or a condition. Under such an interpretation, the Waldron opinion
implies that, in the Court's view, unsafe acts are not always such
that reasonable men would agree that an otherwise safe ship on
which they occur is necessarily reasonably fit. Such an interpretation
would, therefore, overrule the instant unseaworthiness doctrine and
the act-condition distinction.198 In view of the remand in Waldron,
198. The Waldron decision has apparently been interpreted by the Fourth Circuit
as overruling the act-condition distinction: "It is now settled that the negligent misuse
of safe and sufficient equipment renders a vessel unseaworthy [citing Waldron v.
Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 386 U.S. 724, 727 (1967)]." Venable v. A/S Det
Forenede Dampskibsselskab, No. 11,799, at 6 (4th Cir., June 12, 1968).
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it would also indicate that as to acts, as with conditions, unseaworthiness does not depend on negligence. Such a broad interpretation, however, is not required by the Waldron opinion or its result. The actcondition distinction should continue to be decisive, at least in cases
of assaults by competent crew members. To what extent liability
will be denied because injury resulted directly from the act of a seaman, without a plan or order which can be said to have created a

condition, perhaps remains an open question.
A final issue decided by the Court in Waldron was that the error
below was reversible despite the unquestioned jury verdict for defendant on the issue of negligence. The dissenters argued that, accepting
the majority's view of the law, the error, if any, was harmless, since
under the circumstances of the case, a finding of a lack of negligence
amounted to a finding of seaworthiness. They argued that, where the
sole cause of injury was admittedly the issuance of an order assigning
a certain number of men to do a job, in the absence of "special circumstances," a finding of lack of negligence in the issuance of the order
is synonymous with a finding that the assignment was not imprudent
seamanship. The dissent reasoned that the jury verdict merely indicated that the jury did not believe or accept the testimony of the
defendant's expert as to the number of men required to do the job
assigned in reasonable safety.
A commentator' 9 9 has suggested that the finding of reasonable
care could allow a consistent finding of unseaworthiness in Waldron
only if it were also found that the mate found himself in an emergency situation when delivering his order. The law of negligence
requires a finding of negligence only if the actor is found to have
failed to exercise the care of a reasonable man under the circumstances.
In an emergency the rule does not change, but one of the circumstances to be considered is that of the emergency, in which a reasonable man is not expected to exercise the same quality of judgment
that might be expected of him under normal circumstances. Thus,
the jury could have found that in the emergency the mate exercised
reasonable care and yet was mistaken. In conjunction with a finding
of emergency, a finding of reasonable care could mean that the jury
felt either that the mate was correct in opting for a situation that was
reasonably safe or that he made a mistake, by deciding on a course of
conduct not reasonably safe, but was excused under the circumstances.
The argument is made that only in the latter case could the vessel
have been unseaworthy where the mate acted reasonably. It would
appear that the dissent felt that, as a matter of law, the mate was not
' 200
faced by an emergency - that there were "no such special facts.
It has been suggested, however, that the dissent was in error and
that there was sufficient evidence of an emergency introduced to take
the emergency issue to the jury. It is argued that "the remand in this
case should have required the trial judge to instruct the jury that they
may decide the issue of unseaworthiness only if they find that an extra199. 36 FORDHAM L. Rtv. 348 (1967).
200. 386 U.S. at 729.
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ordinary, i.e., emergency, situation existed."2 °1 But in fact no such
instructions were given to the trial court upon remand.
The fallacy of this argument and of that of the dissent is that
both require the jury to view the scene through the eyes of the mate.
This seems to be a form of the "marriage" of unseaworthiness with
concepts of negligence that has been condemned by the majority in
both the Mitchell and Waldron cases. The question to be decided by
the jury on the issue of unseaworthiness is not whether the mate acted
with reasonable prudence - exercised reasonable judgment and caution - in creating a condition which caused an injury; the question is
rather whether the condition created was reasonably safe in view of
the intended course of operations. It is submitted that the trier of
fact should not be restricted in his view of the facts to that of the mate
or of any other particular observer at the scene of the accident.
As was described in the last section, some difficulty has been
encountered in trying to apply the "reasonable fitness" test to factual
situations. Although various specific rules, such as those requiring
a finding of negligence, of more than a transitory condition, or of the
improper use of equipment and not merely personnel, have been rejected by the Supreme Court, the guidance of the jury need not stop
at the blanket definition of seaworthiness as "reasonable fitness for
intended use." The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit said: "Reasonable suitability of ship and equipment is spelled out in terms of
matching operating proficiency against anticipated operating conditions. 20 2 Or, more fully:
The subsidiary questions leading to ultimate conclusion of seaworthiness are therefore: What is the vessel to do? What are
the hazards, the perils, the forces likely to be incurred? Is the
vessel or the particular fitting under scrutiny, sufficient to withstand those anticipated forces? If the answer is in the affirmative, the vessel (or its fitting) is seaworthy. If the answer is in the
negative, then the vessel (or the fitting) is unseaworthy no matter
how diligent, careful, or prudent the owner might have been.203
This formulation is flexible and allows for the fact that unseaworthiness is a relative term. 0 4 The term is relative in that the absence of
a guard rail might render a vessel unseaworthy at sea but not while
201. 36 FORDHAm L. Rev. 348, 352 (1967).
202. Marshall v. Ove Skou Rederi A/S, 378 F.2d 193, 196 (5th Cir. 1967), quoting
Mills v. Mitsubishi Shipping Co., 358 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1966).
203. Marshall v. Ove Skou Rederi A/S, 378 F.2d 193, 196 (5th Cir. 1967), quoting
Walker v. Harris, 335 F.2d 185, 191 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 930 (1964).
204. Marshall v. Ove Skou Rederi A/S, 378 F.2d 193, 196 (5th Cir. 1967);
Shenker v. United States, 322 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 907
(1964) (vessel held unseaworthy as a result of dunnage lying on hatch cover serving
no purpose) ; Walker v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 320 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1963); Mesle v.

Kea S.S. Corp., 260 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 966 (1959)

(shores designed to prevent cargo from shifting at sea must also be fit to be torn
down safely) ; Brown v. Dravo Corp., 258 F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 960 (1959) ; Lester v. United States, 234 F.2d 625 (2d Cir. 1956) ; Hanrahan
v. Pacific Transport Co., 262 F. 951 (2d Cir. 1919).
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motionless in dry dock undergoing repairs. 2°" Reasonable fitness is
required only for an intended use under the circumstances present, and
the Fifth Circuit formulation allows for this. It also does not preclude
the retention of the instant unseaworthiness rule if such is desired.
Despite occasional decisions finding seaworthiness or unseaworthi20 6
ness as a matter of law, the issue is usually treated as one of fact,
205. Lester v. United States, 234 F.2d 625 (2d Cir. 1956); cf. Hanrahan v.
Pacific Transport Co., 262 F. 951, 952 (2d Cir. 1919) (lack of hand rail may render
ship unseaworthy for rough water but not for discharging cargo while lying alongside wharf).
206. It has often been said that unseaworthiness is ordinarily a question of fact.
Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944); Mills v. Mitsubishi Shipping Co.,
358 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1036 (1967); Knox v. United
States Lines Co., 294 F.2d 354 (3d Cir. 1961); Morales v. City of Galveston, 291
F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1961), aff'd, 370 U.S. 165 (1962) ; Bruszewski v. Isthmian S.S. Co.,
163 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1947) ; Krey v. United States, 123 F.2d 1008 (2d Cir. 1941) ;
M. NORRIS, MARITIM4 PXRSONAL INJURI4S § 45, at 98-99 (2d ed. 1966). Thus courts
have left the issue of unseaworthiness to the jury, at least where the jury is properly
instructed, Blier v. United States Lines Co., 286 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 836 (1961), and where reasonable minds could differ on the issue, Walker v.
Sinclair Ref. Co., 320 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1963). In McAllister v. United States, 348
U.S. 19, 20 (1954), the Supreme Court ruled:
In reviewing a judgment of a trial court, sitting without a jury in admiralty,
the Court of Appeals may not set aside the judgment below unless it is clearly
erroneous. No greater scope of review is exercised by the appellate tribunals in
admiralty cases than they exercise under Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. . . . A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is
evidence to support it, the reviewing Court on the entire evidence is left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed....
The view that unseaworthiness is a question of fact is bolstered by appellate decisions
that have applied the "clearly erroneous" rule. See, e.g., Smith v. M/V Gisna, 362
F.2d 164 (5th Cir. 1966); Texas Menhaden Co. v. Johnson, 332 F.2d 527 (5th Cir.
1964); Castro v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 325 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1963) ; Morales
v. City of Galveston, 291 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1961), aff'd, 370 U.S. 165 (1962). See also
41 ST. JOHN'S L. Rnv. 602 (1967). But the question of whether unseaworthiness is a

question of fact or of law is not completely free of controversy. One view is that the
trier of fact is to decide the facts both from the viewpoint of what happened and
what conditions were present and from the viewpoint of whether the conditions
present were reasonably fit and seaworthy. Smith v. M/V Gisna, 362 F.2d 164 (5th
Cir. 1966). The other view is that, although the trier of fact must obviously decide
what took place and what conditions were present and caused the injury, it is a question of law whether those conditions were unseaworthy. Shenker v. United States,
322 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1963) (Friendly, J., dissenting); Van Carpals v. The S.S.
American Harvester, 297 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 865 (1962) ;
Krey v. United States, 123 F.2d 1008 (2d Cir. 1941). It would seem that the former
view is the majority view and has been endorsed by the Supreme Court in Mitchell,
where the case was remanded for a jury determination of whether the unsafe condition
was unseaworthy. See also Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955)
(affirming finding of unseaworthiness below). The Supreme Court has decided the
issue of unseaworthiness as a matter of law but explained its action on the ground
that the issue was decided as a matter of law below. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co.,
321 U.S. 96, 98-99 (1944). In the same case, however, the Court stated that unseaworthiness is usually a question of fact. Other appellate courts have decided the issue
of unseaworthiness as a matter of law in isolated cases. These cases have generally
involved a failure of a piece of equipment where the evidence clearly showed that the
equipment was being put to ordinary usage at the time, or at least where there had
been no evidence of improper usage, see Marshall v. Ove Skou Rederi A/S, 378
F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1967); Mills v. Mitsubishi Shipping Co., 358 F.2d 609 (5th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1036 (1967); Vega v. The Malula, 291 F.2d 415 (5th
Cir. 1961); Sprague v. Texas Co., 250 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1957), or where a vessel
succumbed to a foreseeable outside force, see Walker v. Harris, 335 F.2d 185 (5th
Cir. 1964).
It seems clear that in a case involving a distinction between an act and a
condition, it is for the trier of fact to decide this question. Robichaux v. Kerr McGee
Oil Industries, Inc., 376 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1967) ; Puddu v. Royal Netherlands S.S.
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both as to the decision of what actually took place and as to the decision of whether such facts constitute reasonable fitness. The law of
unseaworthiness is marked by a reluctance of appellate courts to reverse the decisions of the trier of fact, which results in many affirmances20 7 The appellate courts generally permit the trier of fact to
view fitness in any reasonable way that seems appropriate under the
circumstances. The Second Circuit has gone so far as to reverse a
decision below because it felt that the trier of fact did not realize its
freedom of perspective in deciding the case before it. 08 The Supreme
Court's decisions are consistent with this thesis. The Court has consistently stated, not that a certain condition must have been found unseaworthy, but that it may have been found unseaworthy and that
certain particular limiting rules should not have been placed on the
doctrine as a matter of law.209 Thus, the history of the law of unseaworthiness may be viewed not as an expansion by the Supreme Court
but rather as a refusal to allow limitations to be placed upon what a
trier of fact might reasonably perceive as unfitness.
This attitude is graphically represented by the Mitchell decision,
which reversed a finding of no unseaworthiness for error in requiring
a finding of prior notice of the slippery rail for unseaworthiness liability to attach, and the Morales decision, which affirmed a finding of
no unseaworthiness where injury was found to be caused by an unforeseeable outside force. Presumably, the trier of facts in Mitchell might
well have been affirmed had there been a finding of seaworthiness
based upon proper instructions allowing a freedom of perspective as
to what might constitute unfitness under the circumstances. Such a
finding might well have been affirmed even though it was justified
only by a finding that danger of injury from the conditions was not
reasonably foreseeable or avoidable. A defect or other unfitness need
not be foreseeable or avoidable to constitute unseaworthiness, but a
trier of fact should be allowed to view situations as they normally
are viewed to determine if injury was caused by an unfitness, or by
some unforeseeable or unavoidable force or risk which a vessel may
fail to overcome and yet still be considered fit.
In McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 1 ° the Court reversed a
judgment for defendant, finding error in the instructions to the jury.
The instructions given implied that the jury might find unseaworthiness only if it were to find that the alleged defect was of such a quality
as to render the whole vessel unfit for its intended purpose. The
Court's decision implies that the trier of facts must be allowed to focus
Co., 303 F.2d 752 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 840 (1962). See also Titus v.
The Santorini, 258 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1958) ; Note, The Doctrine of Unseaworthiness
in the Lower Federal Courts, 76 HARv. L. Rzv. 819, 828 (1963).

It would seem that unseaworthiness should be treated as an issue of fact
except in cases where the particular facts are such that reasonable men could not

disagree on the ultimate decision, and that appellate courts should restrict themselves
to ensuring that juries are properly instructed and that trial courts have properly

viewed the rules of unseaworthiness law.

207. See, e.g., cases cited in Radovich v. Cunard S.S. Co., 364 F.2d 149, 152 (2d
Cir. 1966).
208. See Radovich v. Cunard S.S. Co., 364 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1966).
209. See notes 64-118 supra and accompanying text.
210. 357 U.S. 221 (1958).
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on the particular aspects of the ship which seem appropriate under

the circumstances. On the other hand, the naked remand in Waldron,
which did not restrict the new trier of fact, may be interpreted as a
ruling that a trier of fact is not to be restricted to focusing on only
one aspect of the ship, here the mate's decision, from only one vantage
point, here that of the mate. The trier of fact may consider the
mate's fitness and his decision, but should be allowed to view the
situation from the vantage point, not of any particular actor at the
scene, but of an objective observer viewing any human actors as just
another aspect of the total picture."' This is perhaps what has been
meant by courts stating 21
that
unseaworthiness should be decided under
2
all of the circumstances.
Within a month of deciding Waldron, the Supreme Court handed
down a per curiam opinion in Mascuilli v. United States.2 1' The opinion states only that certiorari is granted and that the judgment is
reversed and cites as authority Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co. 21 4 and

Crumady v. The Joachin Hendrik Fisser.215 Justices Harlan, Stewart,
and White opposed the granting of certiorari.
Mascuilli was a wrongful death action brought under the Pennsylvania statute against a shipowner, the United States, in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania by
the administratrix of the estate of a longshoreman. Death befell decedent, a tag line tender working on deck, when the non-defective,
heavy-duty rig being used to load combat tanks was "tightlined" causing a shackle to part and part of the rig to recoil and fall upon him.
The district court found for the shipowner on both the negligence and
unseaworthiness issues, stating as a finding of fact:
35. In summary, the Court finds that the vessel and all of
its equipment was in a seaworthy condition at all times, and remained so throughout the entire loading operations. The accident
was caused solely by the negligent operation of the stevedoring

crew using seaworthy equipment in such a manner as to cause
the accident to occur so instantaneously that the Third Officer
was unable to warn anyone or prevent its happening.2 16
The court went on at length to describe the excellence of the equipment in all respects and the overwhelming proof of its condition. It
did not state whether the circuit breakers on the equipment were
properly set but specifically concluded that the winch circuit breakers
had no bearing on the causation of the accident in that the winch
attached to the parted shackle was paying out when the accident
211. See Note, The Doctrine of Unseaworthiness in the Lower Federal Courts,
76 HARV. L. Rzv. 819, 827 (1963).
212. International Navigation Co. v. Farr & Bailey Mfg. Co., 181 U.S. 218 (1901)
(damage to cargo) ; Marshall v. Ove Skou Rederi A/S, 378 F.2d 193, 201 (5th Cir.
1967) (personal injury). See also Carabellese v. Naviera Aznar, S.A., 285 F.2d 355
(2d Cir. 1960) (same).
213. 387 U.S. 237 (1967).
214. 321 U.S. 96 (1944). See notes 71-73 supra and accompanying text.
215. 358 U.S. 423 (1959). See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
216. Mascuilli v. United States, 241 F. Supp. 354, 362 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (emphasis added).
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occurred, and was constructed in such a way that the circuit breakers
would not operate in that position. The court found that, "13 ...
The only feasible explanation for permitting these individual vangs
to become simultaneously taut, also known as tightlining, would 21
be
inadvertence or inattention in the operation of the vang winches.1
It went on to conclude as a matter of law that the shipowner was
not negligent and that, "12 .... Libelant's proposed findings of fact
(No. 10) concedes the accident occurred instantaneously and thus
there was no time to issue any warnings or instructions to any of
the winch operators or the signalman.

2

18

Clearly the court felt that

it was deciding a case of pure operational negligence, instant unseaworthiness, for which liability should not attach. It stated:
18. This Court now finds in favor of the respondent, and
it does not believe that its decision is contrary to those principles
enunciated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit or the Supreme Court of the United States. The present
case, in this Court's opinion, is a specie that belongs in that infinitesimal area that has been described consistently by all the
Appellate Courts and the Supreme Court of the United States
as one in which an owner is not obligated to furnish an accidentfree ship.
19. The instant case is one that stands on its own facts,
merits, and unusual circumstances, and consequently, has been
analyzed thoroughly with a high degree of assiduity. 19
These words clearly indicate that the court realized the difficulty of
finding a situation involving a truly instantaneously caused injury
under today's expanded notion of "condition." Presumably to avoid
reversal, it recited many of the canons of unseaworthiness law gleaned
from prior Supreme Court decisions. 2
The Third Circuit affirmed in a per curiam opinion, stating that:
"[T]he findings of fact by the trial court that the vessel and its equipment were in a seaworthy condition at all times throughout the loading operations and that the accident was caused solely by the negli217.
218.
219.
220.

Id. at 358.
Id. at 364 (emphasis added).
Id. at 364-65.
Id. at 363:
Conclusions of Law

2. A longshoreman injured while engaged in loading a vessel, the work traditionally performed by the crew, is entitled to recover for either negligence or
unseaworthiness.
4. Seaworthiness, a species of liability without fault, imposes a duty upon the
shipowner to furnish a vessel and appurtenances reasonably fit for their intended
use. This does not mean that a shipowner is an insurer or that he must furnish
an accident-free ship. The ship need not be able to weather every storm, only
that she be reasonably fit for her intended use.
5. The doctrine of unseaworthiness is not dependent upon actual or constructive knowledge of the shipowner nor of the merely temporary nature of the
unseaworthy condition. An unseaworthy condition may arise from defective gear,
appurtenance in disrepair, unfit crew, method of loading her cargo, or the
method of storage.
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gent operation of the stevedoring crew as stated in finding of fact #35,
are not clearly erroneous." ' ' The Third Circuit's opinion is somewhat puzzling. It had seemed apparent from its decisions in Thompson
22 2
v. Calmar Steamship Corporation
and Ferrantev. Swedish American Lines228 that the Third Circuit had discarded the instant unseaworthiness doctrine and would require that a ship be tested by a trier
of fact for reasonable fitness even if injury were occasioned instantaneously by an act on an otherwise seaworthy ship. The circuit's
Mascuilli opinion is ambiguous. It can be taken as meaning that the
Mascuilli facts could support a finding of seaworthiness, reasonable
fitness, even accepting the negligent acts as potentially unseaworthy
though instantaneously causing injury. It can also be interpreted as
meaning that the previous Third Circuit cases did not discard the
act-condition distinction completely but merely allowed unseaworthiness to be found, as the facts permitted, not in acts instantaneously
causing injury but rather in unsafe conditions embodied in equipment rendered unsafe by acts prior to injury or in unsafe methods
of operation.
Even more puzzling is the Supreme Court's unexplained reversal
in Mascuilli. The Court's decision is subject to a myriad of interpretations. Plaintiff's brief contained three grounds for a finding of
unseaworthiness:
1. The safety devices on the winches were set in excess of the
safety limits of the cargo handling gear, and, as in Crumady,
the longshoremen brought the unseaworthy condition into play;
2. assuming that the equipment was proper, the negligent handling of the same by the longshoremen created a dangerous condition which rendered the vessel unseaworthy; 3. the longshoremen themselves were not equal in disposition and seamanship to
men in the ordinary calling at the time of the accident and therefore the vessel
was unseaworthy as in Boudoin v. Lykes Bros.
S.S. Corp.224
Presumably plaintiff's second contention is that operational negligence alone may be unseaworthiness and that the district court erred
in not realizing this. The Supreme Court's reversal has been interpreted
by the Second Circuit, in a dictum in Candiano v. Moore-McCormack
Lines, Jnc,228 as adopting this view. That court characterized the
Supreme Court's Mascuilli holding as "apparently" discarding the
instant unseaworthiness rule and allowing a ship to be found unseaworthy for injury caused by operational negligence alone. The Candiano court apparently based its opinion on what United States Law
221. Mascuilli v. United States, 358 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1966).
222. 331 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1964). See note 149 supra.
223. 331 F.2d 571 (3d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 801 (1964). See note 149
supra.
224. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 2, Mascuilli v. United States, 387 U.S. 237
(1967), as paraphrased in 14 LoYoLA L. Riiv. 174, 181 (1967-68). See also Note,
Unseaworthiness, Operational Negligence, and the Death of the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 43 NoTrA DAmA LAwYZR 550, 563 (1968).

225. 382 F.2d 961 (2d Cir. 1967).
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Week reported as the fundamental question before the Supreme Court:
"Does dangerous condition caused by stevedore's negligent handling
of proper equipment render vessel unseaworthy and its owner liable
for resulting injuries ?1226
The Candiano decision was followed on the same day by the
Second Circuit's decision in Alexander v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,227
in which the court affirmed a judgment based on a jury verdict of
unseaworthiness, stating that the trial court had properly refused to
instruct the jury to distinguish between operational negligence and
unseaworthiness. In both Candiano and Alexander, unseaworthy conditions of equipment might have been found apart from operational
negligence, but the Second Circuit decided that the questions of
whether the condition had existed for an appreciable period of time
before injury, as in Candiano, or whether the condition was distinguished from operational negligence, as in Alexander, were no longer
relevant issues in unseaworthiness law in light of II'ascuilli.
The Fourth Circuit has also interpreted Mascuilli as discarding
the operational negligence-unseaworthiness distinction, rejecting the
contention that the Supreme Court reversed, citing Crumady and
Mahnich, merely because of a factual similarity between Mascuilli and
those cases. 22 8 In its opinion in Venable v. A/S Det Forenede Dampskibsselskab,229 the Fourth Circuit also cited Waldron v. MooreMcCormack Lines, Inc.,28 0 as authority for the statement: "It is now
settled that the negligent misuse of safe and sufficient equipment
renders a vessel unseaworthy. '' 231

In Venable the court reversed a

judgment based on a jury verdict of no unseaworthiness because of
error in the trial court's instructions, which attempted to distinguish
between operational negligence and unseaworthiness. The facts of the
case, which involved spaces left between stowed hogsheads and a
failure to provide dunnage to cover them, were such as to allow for
a finding of an unseaworthy condition, apart from active negligence.
Despite this formidable authority supporting the view that Mascuilli has discarded the act-condition distinction, the decision is subject
to other interpretations. While denying defendant shipowner's motion
for summary judgment on the ground that the facts were not sufficiently clear for decision without a trial, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana stated in dictum in Jackson
v. S.S. King's Point,2 2 that the Supreme Court's Mascuilli opinion
could be interpreted as the Second Circuit has interpreted it or, more
conservatively, as maintaining the act-condition distinction but extending ".

.

. unseaworthiness to its furthest possible limit so that

unseaworthiness will be presumed to exist whenever there is any question at all as to whether or not a 'condition' caused the longshore226. Id. at 962, quoting 35 U.S.L.W. 3052 (U.S., July 26, 1966).
227. 382 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1967).
228. Venable v. A/S Det Forenede Dampskibsselskab, No. 11,799 (4th Cir., June
12, 1968).
229. Id.
230. 386 U.S. 724 (1967).
231. Venable v. A/S Det Forenede Dampskibsselskab, No. 11,799, at 6 (4th Cir.,
June 12, 1968).
232. 276 F. Supp. 451 (E.D. La. 1967).
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man's injuries. 23 3 The Jackson court declined to state that either
interpretation was the correct holding of Mascuilli but did state that,
though it disliked expanding the liability of innocent shipowners, either
interpretation of Mascuilli would be preferable to the present state of
the law, since the act-condition distinction causes unjust inconsistency
and uncertainty.
A third possible interpretation of Mascuilli is that embodied in
plaintiff's third argument for reversal - that the longshoremen were
unfit themselves, rendering the vessel unseaworthy. This interpretation has been discredited by one commentator 23 4 on what seem to
be reasonable grounds. The Supreme Court cited as authority for its
reversal the Crumady and Mahnich cases, both of which dealt with the
ftness of equipment, not personnel, and failed to cite the Boudoin
case which specifically dealt with unseaworthiness embodied in unfit
personnel. Further, the district court's conclusion of law number 17,
though it described the longshoreman crew as " 'not equal in disposition and seamanship to the ordinary men in the calling' at the time
the ninth tank was loaded, ' 23 5 was probably intended to indicate
negligence and not unseaworthiness since the court elsewhere described
at length, and favorably, the experience and qualifications of the crew.
Another possible interpretation is that the trial court failed to
divorce a requirement of negligence from its decision of unseaworthiness. Whenever the district court, in its opinion, mentioned the instantaneous nature of the accident, it qualified its remarks by reference to
the inability of the shipowner's representatives to act to correct the
situation in so short a time. These remarks obviously correctly state
the issue as to negligence but are irrelevant to unseaworthiness considerations under Mitchell. This interpretation, however, is probably
not warranted. The Supreme Court did not cite Mitchell or Waldron
in its opinion, which would have been likely if the failure to divorce
negligence and unseaworthiness had been the ground for reversal.
In addition, the district court evidenced in its conclusions of law
that it realized that unseaworthiness liability does not depend on fault
or notice.23 8
Another interpretation is that the Supreme Court reversed because the trial court failed to realize that under at least one interpretation of Waldron unseaworthiness may be found in bare acts when
those acts are pursuant to order. The district court stated as a conclusion of law: "15. The accident was caused by a failure of the longshoremen to cooperate and comply with the proper loading procedure.
The directions of the signalman were not followed or were improper.
In the instant case, it was absolutely essential that all longshoremen
'
act as a unit to insure the success of these operations." 237
Thus the
233. Id. at 453. See Note, Unseaworthiness, Operational Negligence, and the
Death of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 43 No'rnA
DAME LAWYXR 550, 564-65 (1968).
234. 14 LoYoLA L. Rxv. 174, 183-84 (1967-68).

651 (1968).

See also 42 TUL. L. Rsv. 648,

235. Mascuilli v. United States, 241 F. Supp. 354, 364 (E.D. Pa. 1965).

236. See note 220 supra.

237. Mascilli v. United States, 241 F. Sup. 354, 364 (R.D. Pa. 1965).
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district court failed to distinguish between whether the signalman's
directions (orders) were proper, but not correctly followed, or were
improper in themselves and caused injury when carried out. Under
one interpretation of the Supreme Court's Waldron decision,2 38 the
former possibility could not in itself be an unseaworthy condition but
the latter could; thus it would seem that the trial court should have
made a factual determination of this issue. This interpretation of
Mascuilli, however, is probably not called for, since Waldron is not
cited by the Supreme Court in its reversing opinion.
The last interpretation of Mascuilli, petitioner's first ground for
reversal, is that the district court erred in not finding that, apart
from operational negligence, an unseaworthy condition of equipment
existed where the winches used were constructed in such a way that
circuit breakers would not operate when the winches were paying out
and/or the circuit breakers were improperly set so as not to operate
even when the winches were winding in. The Third Circuit's opinion
was phrased in terms of a conclusion that the district court's findings
of fact were not clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court's reversal,
then, can be interpreted as merely holding the district court's findings
of fact to be clearly erroneous. Under this interpretation it would be
argued that the Crumady and Mahnich cases were merely cited because of the factual similarity between the defects in equipment in
those cases and the defects involved in Mascuilli. This interpretation
has been favored by at least one commentator.23 9 It does seem that
the district court was clearly in error when it held the condition of the
circuit breakers irrelevant to the determination of the cause of injury.
The court stated that the circuit breakers could have had no effect
because the winch attached to the shackle which parted was in a paying out position at the time, a position in which the circuit breakers
were not constructed to function. Clearly when the rig "tightlined,"
the tautness of the lines was caused by two winches working in
opposite directions, and it was the other winch, opposite to the one
attached to the shackle, which was winding in at the time of the accident and which should have stopped, had its circuit breaker been set
properly.240 Perhaps the circuit breaker was in fact set properly, but
certainly the district court was in error in dismissing this issue
from consideration.
It would seem that on general principles of jurisprudence, this
last interpretation of Mascuilli is the best. Under this interpretation,
Mascuilli leaves the state of the law unchanged and does not overrule,
by implication, the well-established act-condition distinction. The prevailing view, however, seems to be that Mascuilli stands for one of
the broader propositions discussed above.
238. See notes 195-96 supra and accompanying text.
239. See 14 LOYOLA L. Rsv. 174 (1967-68). See also Note, Unseaworthiness,
Operational Negligence, and the Death of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, 43 Norag DAMg LAWYSR 550 (1968) ; 42 TUL. L. Riv. 648 (1968).
240. The court found as a fact that

"

. . . the after starboard vang was being

heaved in at a greater rate of speed than the other vangs were being payed-out."

241 F. Supp. at 362.
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CONCLUSION

The instant unseaworthiness doctrine is presumably still a part
of the law of unseaworthiness. Indeed, it is probably the most important of the surviving rules which keep the shipowner from becoming
an insurer of all injuries aboard his ship. The Supreme Court has
stated that the seaworthiness of a vessel or part of a vessel is to be
judged by its reasonable fitness for an intended use.2 4 The Court has
not seen fit to put specific limitations upon this test by fashioning
specific rules for different types of factual situations, and it is submitted that the lower courts should follow the Court's lead in this
regard. In the Waldron case, the Court struck down one such rule
which rejected a finding of unseaworthiness in a case where too few
men were used to do a job pursuant to order, 24 2 and apparently
eliminated another which precluded a finding of unseaworthiness where
an unsafe operation was performed pursuant to an order.24 It is
apparent that the Court desires unseaworthiness to be decided, on a
factual basis, merely by the flexible concept of reasonable fitness, tempered, perhaps, by a requirement that an unsafe condition be found. 244
Even the requirement of a condition may be interpreted as inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's history of striking down specific limitations
placed, as a matter of law, on what may be found to be unreasonable
unfitness of a vessel.
A legal system marked by freedom vested in the trier of fact,
which is essentially the state of the law of unseaworthiness today, 245
will necessarily produce opposite results in many cases which are seemingly indistinguishable on their facts. Such a system could not, however, result in any more confusion than has the instant unseaworthiness limitation. 246 The Waldron case is another example of the view
of a majority of the Supreme Court that seamen are to be liberally
treated and that the lower courts are not to fashion rules which result
in the question of reasonable fitness being withheld from the jury.
It is submitted that despite the probable added burden on shipowners, the confusing instant unseaworthiness rule should be discarded.
Although the removal of this specific limitation on the unseaworthiness
doctrine is probably not required by Waldron or Mascuilli, it would
be consistent with the spirit of these cases and the recent trend which
seems to foreshadow a rule under which a seaman will be able to have
the issue of unseaworthiness submitted to the jury whenever any injury is caused in any manner around or aboard a ship and whenever
reasonable men might differ as to the reasonable fitness of the ship.
Carroll E. Neesemann
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